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The illegal drug trade has been present in Mexico 
since the beginning of the twentieth century when 
prohibition of the opium trade started. Since then, the 
social harm of the illegal drug trade in all its forms has 
been constantly increasing. Today, the most obvious example 
of the social harm of the illegal drug trade in Mexico is 
drug-related crime. As a result, Mexican authorities have 
launched a frontal attack against the drug cartels in an 
effort to reduce drug-related violence. However, the 
results of these efforts have not been as expected. One of 
the main problems that Mexican authorities face in their 
war on drugs is the lack of a well-coordinated anti-drug 
strategy to fight the illegal drug trade. Further, the 
efforts made by the Mexican government are based on a 
supply-reduction approach that has proved ineffective both 
in Mexico and around the world over the last century 
because it is not aimed at the social roots of the illegal 
drug trade. Thus, Mexico’s war on drugs has become a never-
ending story. This thesis traces this history and then 
proposes a broader integrated approach based on attacking 
the roots of the illegal drug trade in Mexico. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE “WAR ON DRUGS” IN MEXICO 
For more than ten years, the Mexican government has 
been following the same anti-drug policy in an effort to 
deter the illegal drug trade and the major drug-trafficking 
organizations that are based in various parts of the 
country. Mexico’s anti-drug policy has focused mainly on 
trying to reduce the supply of illegal drugs by attacking 
the drug cartels. However, regardless of the vast amount of 
resources expended on interdiction operations, the flow of 
illegal drugs into and out of Mexico continues more or less 
unabated, while the negative by-products associated with 
the illegal drug trade keep growing. The most visible of 
these is the increase in violence as different groups fight 
over control of the main trafficking routes to the United 
States and the distribution centers within Mexico, and/or 
engage in armed conflict with the government forces in the 
latter’s unsuccessful attempt to curtail or eliminate the 
illegal drug trade.  
It can be argued that the main reason both the flow of 
illegal drugs and the violence continues, is that the 
Mexican government has overlooked the deeper social roots 
that underpin the continued importance and expansion of the 
illegal drug trade. Both the supply-side and the demand-
side of the illegal drug trade can only be understood and 
appropriately addressed when the deeper social roots, such 
as poverty and inequality, are brought into the picture. 
The main question at this juncture (given the lack of 
success of the supply-reduction approach over the past 10 
years or more) is whether a change in Mexico’s anti-drug 
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policy can reduce the violence and the flow of drugs, as 
well as address the deeper social problems related to the 
illegal drug trade. To this end this introductory chapter 
first sketches out the main research question, and then 
outlines the organization of the thesis. This is followed 
by a short reiterative conclusion. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION: IS MEXICO’S ANTI-DRUG POLICY 
WORKING?  
While poverty and social inequality have longer and 
deeper origins than the illegal drug trade as such, the 
latter has been present in Mexico in one form or another 
for most of the last century. However, it has only been in 
the later years of the twentieth century, and now in the 
first decade of the twenty-first century, that the illegal 
drug trade has been, and is formally regarded as, a 
national security threat. Despite this fact, the Mexican 
government’s anti-drug policy is relegated to a few 
paragraphs in Mexico’s National Development Plan 2002–2012 
(Estados Unidos Mexicanos Presidencia de la República 
[Presidencia de la República], 2007), at the same time as 
its operation is spread across a range of federal programs. 
However, these programs tend to treat the problem mainly as 
a police issue. 
Apart from a narrow conception of the problem as a law 
enforcement issue handled by different branches of the 
government bureaucracy, another shortcoming of Mexico’s 
anti-drug policy is its lack of a clear objective. Thus, 
Mexico’s government is not able to measure and compare the 
quantitative outcomes of its current counter-drug campaign. 
For example, what is the real impact of the arrest of 
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thousands of drug cartel members over the last three years 
on the illegal drug trade in Mexico as a whole? In 
addition, the use of the term “war on drugs” and the lack 
of a clear definition of what victory in the “war on drugs” 
should look like, is making Mexican authorities appear to 
be neither losing nor winning the war on drugs. 
Even though it is clear that improvements in law 
enforcement are a priority for the Mexican government, 
improved law enforcement by itself is not the way to curb 
or end the illegal drug trade. More specifically, the 
supply-reduction approach has not actually affected the 
demand for illegal drugs in Mexico, or their flow to 
markets further north, especially the United States. 
Instead, the supply-reduction approach has highlighted the 
weakness of the Mexican government, with all the socio-
political implications that this involves. Unfortunately, 
as illegal drug consumption in Mexico and exports increase, 
only a handful of socially oriented harm-reduction programs 
exist. Furthermore, none of them has enough support to be 
effective. In order to achieve real progress in the battle 
against the trafficking and consumption of illegal drugs, 
it is imperative that supply-reduction and harm-reduction 
policies operate in tandem, and focus on the social roots 
of the illegal drug trade. That is to say, an integrated 
anti-drug policy needs to be put in place.  
B. ORGANIZATION: THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY DYNAMICS OF 
THE ILLEGAL DRUG TRADE 
To provide the context for formulating a new, more 
effective anti-drug policy, Chapter II outlines the history 
of the illegal drug trade in Mexico.  It is crucial that we 
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understand how and why the illegal drug trade in Mexico 
evolved in the way it did over the last century. It is also 
worth noting that recurring patterns are to be found. 
Successive Mexican governments have repeatedly followed 
supply-reduction approaches, to address the increase of 
drug-related crimes and the increase in Mexican drug 
demand. They repeatedly initiate operations aimed at the 
decapitation of drug cartel leaders, and attempt to combat 
official corruption with limited or no evidence of long-
term success against the backdrop of continued social 
inequality and poverty. An historical overview will help 
support the argument that social inequality and poverty 
should be the main focus of anti-drug policy in relation to 
both supply and demand, and the achievement of a longer 
term solution. 
In Chapter III, a comparison between a supply-
reduction approach and a harm-reduction approach is made, 
in order to lay out the way these two approaches can 
complement each other to develop a more effective and 
comprehensive anti-drug policy.  The current Mexican anti-
drug policy is also analyzed, as are its results, in order 
to highlight the overall weaknesses of the present 
approach. Finally, Chapter III explores why, despite the 
high risks associated with the illegal drug trade (ranging 
from death to long-term incarceration) people keep joining 
the drug cartels. Chapter III does this in order to make 
clear that social issues are fueling both the rising levels 
of participation in the illegal drug trade in Mexico, and 
the increasing demand on the consumption side of the 
equation. 
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In Chapter IV, possible solutions to improve the 
Mexican anti-drug policy are laid out based on a better 
balance between supply-reduction and harm-reduction 
approaches. It is important that the Mexican government re-
evaluate the current anti-drug policy and define a new and 
clear anti-drug policy. But more important still is to 
highlight that maintaining a frontal attack on the drug 
cartels in Mexico without addressing the social grievances 
that drag people into criminal conduct, has been and will 
be the best way to sure a never-ending fight between the 
government and the drug cartels. 
In the present work, several aspects of the illegal 
drug trade in Mexico are intentionally left out of the 
discussion. The first aspect left out is the participation 
and role of the Mexican armed forces in current counterdrug 
operations. Whatever the problems associated with using the 
armed forces might be, the high level of complicity by 
local police forces in the drug trade left federal decision 
makers with little choice. The Mexican government turned to 
the Mexican armed forces as the most reliable organization 
capable of engaging directly (and often violently) with the 
cartels and with some of the local police forces (as the 
latter are often effectively part of the cartels). The 
second area not covered in this thesis is the drug cartels’ 
finances. The financial aspect is obviously a key component 
in the operation of the drug cartels; however, the scale 
and complexity of the ways in which the cartels turn 
illegally acquired profits into legitimate businesses and 




to address the subject properly. Meanwhile, the major 
impact that illegal drug-trade revenues have on a range of 
local economies is a thesis topic on its own. 
Another important theme beyond the scope of this 
thesis is the international side of the illegal drug trade 
and its relationship to things such as the illegal trade in 
firearms in Mexico. Although the demand for illegal drugs 
in the United States and the black market in firearms north 
of the border are very important in shaping the illegal 
drug trade in Mexico, this thesis focuses on the fact that 
Mexicans themselves have become major consumers of illegal 
drugs, and this aspect is more important than ever, both to 
the operation of the Mexican cartels and to any attempt to 
address the problem. Unless the Mexican government improves 
its own anti-drug policy at the domestic level, drug harm 
is going to continue increasing in Mexico regardless of 
what happens in the United States. On the other hand, the 
illegal arms trade is also driven by demand. Thus, even if 
the United States were able to crack down on illegal arms 
exports to Mexico, the drug cartels could easily look for 
their arms elsewhere (Vera, 2009), and the consumers of 
illegal drugs are going to cover the increase in 
operational costs that the cartels might incur in doing so.  
C. CONCLUSION: WINNING THE “WAR ON DRUGS” IN MEXICO 
Finally, the purpose of this thesis is to show that 
Mexico can improve its anti-drug policy without dishonoring 
international treaties, but also without waiting for other 
countries to change in order to achieve better outcomes in 
Mexico. Regardless of the willingness of the Mexican 
government to fight the illegal drug trade, Mexican 
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authorities cannot expect improvements in their anti-drug 
strategy if they continue following the same anti-drug 
strategy that has proven to be ineffective and inefficient 
for almost a century. The way the illegal drug trade has 
evolved in Mexico is complex and has been driven by a wide 
range of factors, as we will see in Chapter II. Thus, the 
solution will not be simple and will require far more than 
just vigorous or innovative law enforcement efforts, 
because the roots of the issue go well beyond the drug 
cartels and their diverse criminal networks. 
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II. CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES: HOW DID MEXICO GET 
FROM “THERE” TO “HERE”? 
The high levels of drug-related violence over the past 
few years have made Mexico the focus of worldwide 
attention. However, the violence within and between the 
drug cartels and/or the federal police and the military in 
Mexico—even the illegal drug trade itself—is not anything 
new. The illegal drug trade in Mexico, with all its 
negative consequences, including fluctuating levels of 
violence, can be traced back to the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Since the 1910s, drug prohibition 
policies developed, implemented, and encouraged by the 
United States have been followed by the international 
community, regardless of the fact that, down to the 
present, drug prohibition policies have failed to slow 
either the demand for drugs or their illegal trade 
worldwide. 
The long-term causes that explain the current 
situation and why the major Mexico-based drug cartels 
dominate the illegal drug trade in the Americas are 
complex. Many simplistic explanations for, and solutions 
to, the latest surge in drug-related violence in Mexico 
have been offered by academics and policy makers. For 
example, José L. Velasco (2005) mentions that the 
“democratic transition [in Mexico] dismantled several links 
between the state and important social groups,” including 
the drug cartels in Mexico (p. 10).  According to Velasco, 
this situation contributed to a more “independent” and 
“confrontational” groups (p. 10). However, even though 
important, the changes to Mexico’s political system in 
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recent years are necessary, but not sufficient to explain 
the illegal drug trade in Mexico generally, and the cycles 
of drug-related violence more specifically. The confluence 
of democratization in Mexico with the unilateral efforts 
made by the United States to crack down on the Caribbean 
drug routes, the turn towards neoliberal economic policies, 
the rising demand for illegal drugs in the United States 
and Mexico, and the structural weaknesses in the current 
international and national anti-drug policies have all 
contributed to the present situation. In order to pave the 
way for a multi-causal or holistic explanation for the 
contemporary problems brought on by the illegal drug trade 
in Mexico, this chapter will set out the historical 
background to Mexico’s illegal drug trade, examining how it 
has been shaped over time. 
A. THE HARRISON BILL AND THE INVENTION OF THE MODERN 
ILLEGAL DRUG TRADE 
Even though alkaloid cocaine was first extracted from 
the leaves of the coca plant in Europe in 1844, little was 
known about its effects until 1883, when it was prescribed 
to Bavarian soldiers to reduce fatigue (Brecher, 1972). By 
the late 1890s, cocaine was commonly used in the United 
States and elsewhere for therapeutic purposes (Brecher). 
One of the medical uses was to sniff small doses of cocaine 
to mitigate the symptoms of a cold. However, sniffing 
cocaine soon became a popular social and recreational 
activity (Courtwright, 2001). 
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In the 1850s, a few decades prior to cocaine becoming 
a common medical remedy and then a focus of recreational 
use, opium smoking had been introduced into the United 
States by Chinese immigrants, who arrived to work on the 
construction of the western railroads (Brecher, 1972). 
According to accounts of the period, Americans were soon 
smoking opium in Chinese opium-smoking houses. However, 
opium “dens” were not widely accepted by the community 
(Brecher). In 1875, government authorities in San Francisco 
promulgated the first law against the smoking of opium. 
This approach was followed by other cities, and by 1914 
there were 27 similar laws within the United States 
prohibiting opium smoking (Brecher). 
This was part of a wider trend, as opposition to the 
non-medical use of opiates gained strength around the 
world. The main arguments against the non-medical use of 
opiates were: the direct harm that users do to themselves 
and to others; the social cost of drug abuse; religious 
disapproval; the association of a particular drug with 
dangerous minorities; and a general concern about the risk 
to the future of society in the context of the widespread 
use of both legal and illegal intoxicants (Courtwright, 
2001). These concerns were partially addressed at a 
meeting, encouraged by the United States, in Shanghai in 
1909 and then in the 1912 Hague International Opium 
Convention. The outcome of these conventions was a drug 
control treaty which addressed the use of drugs for 
recreational purposes, which later on shaped drug control 
laws all over the world (Courtwright; United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2009). 
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By 1914, discussion and debate about the non-medical 
use of opium in the United States revolved around the 
Harrison Bill, which was named after Congressmen Francis 
Burton Harrison from New York, who initially proposed it. 
The main argument presented in favor of the bill was based 
on Washington’s international obligations under the Hague 
Convention of 1912 rather than on health or moral grounds 
(Brecher, 1972). Even though the Harrison Bill was supposed 
to be a regulatory law, it included an important sentence 
indicating that a physician should have recourse to cocaine 
or opium “in the course of his professional practice only” 
(Brecher, p. 49). This particular part of the Harrison Bill 
was later interpreted by the police to mean that those 
addicted to opiates did not suffer from an illness and were 
therefore not to be considered or categorized as patients 
(Brecher). This interpretation ensured that addicts were 
not able to acquire their drugs in a legal and open system. 
Turning to marijuana, it is worth noting that 
marijuana was first introduced to North America in the 
seventeenth century by settlers, who sought to grow hemp 
for textiles (Brecher, 1972). By the 1760s, the colonial 
authorities in Virginia were enthusiastically encouraging 
marijuana crops; George Washington, the first president of 
what would later become the United States of America, was 
among those farmers who grew marijuana. Some commentators 
suggest that he also experimented with improving the 
therapeutic characteristics of the plant (Brecher). With 
the development of cotton fibers by the early twentieth 
century, the production of marijuana decreased. However, 
when the price of alcohol increased and its quality 
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declined in the wake of the National Prohibition Act in 
1920, marijuana became an attractive recreational 
alternative to alcohol (Brecher).  
Later on, marijuana experienced the same legal fate as 
other drugs; by 1937, most of the state governments in the 
United States had enacted anti-marijuana laws. In that year 
also, the Marijuana Tax Act was proposed in the middle of a 
media campaign designed to warn the public of the “evils” 
of the weed. Even though the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 
recognized and allowed the use of marijuana for medical 
purposes and banned it only for recreational use, there was 
a controversy between authorities and physicians about the 
convenience and costs of implementing such a law (Brecher, 
1972). 
None of the above laws or subsequent ones were 
successful in reducing the consumption of the drugs 
concerned. Nor did they succeed in achieving the more 
nebulous goal of improving the overall “moral fiber” of 
American society. On the contrary, both the demand for the 
drugs, and the black market for their buying and selling, 
increased. In 1918, an ad hoc committee that analyzed the 
results of the Harrison Bill observed that there were, 
approximately one million drug users in the United States, 
that the black market in illegal drugs was effectively the 
same size as the legal drug market, and that there were 
significant criminal organizations smuggling drugs into the 
United States from both Canada and Mexico. Finally, the 
committee concluded that addicts moved from their rural 
population centers into the cities in order to obtain drugs 
in the black market (Brecher, 1972). 
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B. COCAINE, OPIUM, MARIJUANA, AND PROHIBITION IN MEXICO 
As in the United States, Mexico, by the late 
nineteenth century, was following the increasingly 
widespread tendency towards the therapeutic and 
recreational uses of cocaine, opium (and heroin), and 
marijuana (Astorga Almanza, 2005). The use of marijuana for 
asthma sufferers, heroin for coughs and colds, not to 
mention opium in laudanum and coca-based tonics, was common 
in this period (Astorga Almanza). Although most of the 
discussion in Mexico about cocaine, opium and its 
derivatives, as well as marijuana, was about how to 
regulate rather than prohibit their use, by 1897 there was 
an increasing amount of opposition to their recreational 
use (Astorga Almanza). 
As in the United States, opium smoking was introduced 
into Mexico by Chinese immigrants, beginning especially in 
1864 when large numbers arrived to work on the construction 
of the railway in Ciudad Juarez and in the cotton fields 
around Mexicali (Astorga Almanza, 2003). Even though most 
of the opium smokers in Mexico were either Chinese or 
American people who crossed the border explicitly to visit 
opium dens, there was concern on the part of many Mexicans, 
both within the government and among the general public 
(often presented in a moralizing fashion), about the 
apparently increasing number of Mexicans who were starting 
to smoke opium (Astorga Almanza, 2005). 
Although Chinese immigration was encouraged by the 
Mexican government, the Chinese were treated to a great 
deal of social discrimination. For some Mexicans, the 
Chinese were an inferior race and a threat to Mexican 
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culture (Treviño Rangel, 2008). In this racist context, 
anti-Chinese committees were constituted in Mexico. The 
basis for these committees was ostensibly the rising tide 
of anti-Chinese racism (Treviño Rangel). However, popular 
wisdom in the northern states attributed the real reason of 
anti-Chinese racism to the desire to take control of the 
illegal opium trade (Astorga Almanza, 2003). In the states 
of Sonora and Sinaloa, Chinese immigrants taught Mexican 
peasants how to grow opium; there were cases in which it is 
suspected that expulsion of the Chinese—from Sonora, for 
example—would have put anti-Chinese activists in a 
favorable position to control the illegal drug trade 
(Astorga Almanza). 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
economic relations between Mexico and the United States 
were becoming increasingly important. According to the 
National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) of 
Mexico, between 1900 and 1901, 79% of Mexico’s exports went 
to the United States, and 54% of its imports came from 
north of the border (Gaona Rivera, 2007). Most of the trade 
was transported by rail at the major railway crossing 
points of Ciudad Juarez–El Paso, Piedras Negras–Eagle Pass, 
Nuevo Laredo–Laredo, and Matamoros–Brownsville along the 
Mexico-Texas border. Apart from the trade itself, the 
growing railway network helped to develop Mexico’s northern 
states (Gaona Rivera). 
The growing importance of the United States to 
Mexico’s economic development, combined in a somewhat 
contradictory fashion after 1910 with the growing chaos of 
the revolution, provided the backdrop for the acceptance by 
 16
the Mexican government of the Hague Convention on illegal 
drugs in 1912. However, thanks to the revolution in Mexico 
(1910–1920), actually doing something about the illegal 
drug trade was a very low priority (Astorga Almanza and 
Gónzalez Román, 2008). This would change somewhat with the 
promulgation of Mexico’s new constitution in 1917. More 
important still, once the Mexican revolution was officially 
over in 1920, the Mexican government banned the growing and 
selling of marijuana, a decision that was linked to its 
membership in the League of Nations. By 1926, the ban had 
been extended to the growth and sale of opium (Astorga 
Almanza, 2005). In fact, since the 1920s, Mexico has 
generally followed Washington’s lead on setting and 
enforcing policies aimed at control or criminalizing the 
growing, producing, and selling of illegal drugs. However, 
the Mexican political system that emerged from the Mexican 
Revolution and the structural limitations of drug 
prohibition policies set the stage for the way that the 
illegal drug trade grew in scale and scope in Mexico over 
the course of the twentieth century. 
C. THE ILLEGAL DRUG TRADE AND THE MEXICAN POLITICAL 
SYSTEM 
Even though the writing and promulgation of the 1917 
constitution was seen as officially marking the end of the 
Mexican Revolution, the post-revolutionary period continued 
to be characterized by serious and violent political 
conflict. Under these circumstances, the early post-
revolutionary Mexican governments had to make arrangements 
with local elites in order to bring peace and order (Paris 
Pombo, 1998). This was the beginning of “corporativismo”; 
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this much-debated term is being used here, as it is often 
used, to describe the way in which the loyalty of local 
politicians, business people, trade union leaders, and the 
caciques that ran peasant organizations, were co-opted by 
the central government via the effective use of patronage 
and concessions (Meyer, 2007). 
The new central government was focused on rebuilding, 
and in many cases building, federal political and 
administrative institutions nationwide; however, it did not 
initially have a strong presence in many of the states of 
Mexico. This meant that state governors in the 1920s had 
almost absolute control over what happened in their part of 
the country; thus, they could do almost everything they 
wanted to do. In his book, Drogas sin Fronteras, Luis A. 
Astorga Almanza (2003) documents several reports by U.S. 
authorities in the 1920s, indicating that they had 
information about Mexican state governors who, they 
suspected, were in charge of the illegal drug trade in 
their respective states. For example, it is mentioned in 
one of these reports that the former governor of Baja 
California, Esteban Cantú, made a deal in 1916 with a 
Chinese opium trafficking group, to let it run its opium-
smoking houses in Ensenada, making a payment of $45,000 for 
the initial concession and monthly payments of $10,000 
(Astorga Almanza). These amounts of money would be the 
equivalent of $878,156.42 and $193,145.87, respectively, in 
terms of contemporary currency value and purchasing power 
(United States Department of Labor, 2009).  
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In the U.S., reports about the illegal activities of 
Governor Cantú, Chas Berstein, a friend of Cantú are 
reported to have mentioned that the governor had told him 
that he planned to “stop the opium trade” and close the 
gambling houses when he had “enough resources” to meet 
“government expenses” (qtd. in Astorga Almanza, 2003, p. 
19). This and other aspects of the report indicate that the 
illegal drug trade might have been supported by some 
government officials not only for personal benefit, but 
also as a means of keeping the incipient post-revolutionary 
local governments running, at a time when government 
finances were scarce at best.  
There are at least two things to notice in particular 
about what was going on in Mexico in the early decades of 
the twentieth century. First, the illegal drug trade did 
not create corruption among Mexican authorities. On the 
contrary, the illegal drug trade was just one of the many 
illegal activities that corrupt officials were running in 
their states and which they were more or less permitted, 
even encouraged, to do given the political arrangements of 
the day (Astorga Almanza, 2001). Second, several cities 
that were mentioned as important to the illegal drug trade 
at the beginning of the twentieth century have retained 
their importance down to the present day. For example, 
Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez, remain crucial transit points 
for drugs entering the United States because the high 
number of vehicles and people crossing each day between the 
two countries makes it very difficult to search them all 
(Blancornelas, 2002; Ravelo, 2006). 
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D. THE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM IN MEXICO 
In 1929, the National Revolutionary Party (PNR) was 
created, as part of an attempt to move beyond the caudillo 
(military-leader) politics that had prevailed before, 
during, and immediately after the Mexican Revolution. The 
goal was for Mexico to become a country of institutions and 
laws. This was a major theme of the address of then 
President Calles to the Mexican Congress in 1928 (“Breve 
historia del PRI,” 2008). The PNR was supposed to channel 
the aspirations of the caudillos through political 
institutions, instead of disputes being resolved via armed 
conflict. This marked the start of a political system in 
Mexico constructed to weaken the power of local elites, or 
caudillos. Once seen as necessary, caudillos had become an 
obstacle to building a modern state (Meyer, 2007). 
However, the PNR was not created to usher in 
democratic elections and political parties; on the 
contrary, it was created to maintain the power of the new 
elite who had won the revolution (Furtak, 2007). The PNR 
modified its structure and changed its name several times 
until, in 1946, it was renamed the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI), the name it has retained to this 
day (“Breve historia del PRI,”2008). Despite some changes, 
the loyalties of local elites and social and political 
organizations continued to be bought by the use of 
patronage. The president of Mexico was also the de facto 
head of the PRI and the reach of his decisions sometimes 
went well beyond any written law. For example, although not 
official policy, the president chose his successor and the 
governors of the various states.  This reflected the fact 
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that the authority of the president was basically beyond 
question. This model was exported to the state level, and 
governors routinely wielded a very high degree of power 
within their states (Meyer, 2007; Paris Pombo, 1998). 
Throughout this period, the illegal drug trade was 
growing in Mexico. Smugglers in Mexico were making a lot of 
money satisfying the demand in the United States, and their 
informal relations with the governors and local authorities 
in the northern states of Mexico in particular became 
increasingly normalized (Astorga Almanza, 2005). Given an 
authoritarian political system such as Mexico had in the 
PRI-era (“Mexico: Damage limitation,” 1993), there is no 
other way to explain how smugglers could have thrived. 
E. THE SECOND PERIOD OF THE ILLEGAL DRUG TRADE IN MEXICO 
According to Astorga Almanza (2001), in 1947 the 
transfer of anti-drug responsibilities from the Department 
of Health to the Office of the General Prosecutor (PGR) and 
the creation of the Federal Security Directorate (DFS) 
marked the start of a distinct second period of the illegal 
drug trade in Mexico.  
Corrupt officials in these two government 
organizations reshaped the way the illegal drug trade was 
conducted. During the Cold War era, the DFS was very 
powerful because it was in charge of the fight against the 
Mexican guerrilla movements and it also helped the CIA 
track the movements of agents of the Soviet Union and Latin 
American leftist organizations in Mexico (Blancornelas, 
2005; Shannon, 1988). Officials were very “effective” at 
repressing leftist activities that did not have the 
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approval of the PRI (“Dirección federal de seguridad,” 
2008). Although the CIA had information concerning the 
involvement of some of the DFS’s members with drugs, the 
CIA’s priority was to stop the advance of communism; 
therefore, it did not want to affect its working 
relationship with the DFS by raising the issue of illegal 
drugs (Shannon). Mylene Sauloy and Yves Le Bonniec (1994) 
go even further and suggest that in the 1980s Mexico’s 
illegal drug organizations played a key role in the Iran-
Contra case and that the CIA used haciendas in Guadalajara 
that belonged to one of the Mexican drug cartels to train 
Nicaraguan contras. 
Compared to the present, there were relatively few 
drug cartels in Mexico in the 1980s, and those there were 
operated in well-defined areas of influence under the 
informal control of the DFS. In order for this arrangement 
to work, it was necessary to maintain the corrupt DFS 
commanders in their positions, which meant the drug cartels 
had to maintain a low profile. However, this original 
arrangement ended in 1985 when Enrique “Kiki” Camarena, a 
DEA agent, was killed in Mexico, apparently on the orders 
of the leaders of one of the drug cartels (Astorga Almanza, 
2001). As a result of Camarena’s murder, Miguel Ángel Félix 
Gallardo and Rafael Caro Quintero, co-founders of the 
Guadalajara cartel (which, once disbanded gave birth to the 
Tijuana/Arrellano Félix and Sinaloa cartels) were arrested 
and the DFS was dismantled because it was evident that it 
had been involved in the crime and that, as an 
organization, it had been corrupted by the drug cartels 
from top to bottom (Willoughby, 2003). In an effort to keep 
the illegal drug trade going in a “peaceful manner”, Félix 
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Gallardo, one of the main drug leaders in the 1980s, from 
prison arranged a meeting among his lieutenants at which 
they subdivided Mexico into territories that would allow 
them to continue to control the drug trade despite his 
arrest (Dávila, 2009). The arrangements made at this 
Acapulco meeting worked for a while. However, it was a 
fragile arrangement from the outset, as would become 
increasingly apparent. 
At the same time the DFS was being dismantled and the 
drug traffickers were regrouping, in the 1980s, other 
important events were transpiring in Mexico and beyond. The 
first steps toward a free trade agreement between Mexico, 
the United States, and Canada were underway. The United 
States, meanwhile, had been very successful in its 
interdiction efforts aimed at dramatically reducing, if not 
eliminating, Florida as an entry point for Colombian drugs 
while, at the same time, the demand for cocaine continued 
to rise. Finally, by the 1980s, legal changes were starting 
to be made in an effort to democratize the Mexican 
political system (Meyer, Youngers, & Bewley-Taylor, 2007; 
Velasco, 2005; Willoughby, 2003). All of these developments 
impacted the illegal drug trade in Mexico. 
F. THE THIRD PERIOD OF THE ILLEGAL DRUG TRADE IN MEXICO 
A crucial outcome of the Camarena affair, as 
previously noted, was the disbanding of the DFS. This was 
one of numerous efforts to “clean up” the various branches 
of the police at the federal level, efforts that have 
continued down to the present. President Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari’s administration (1988–1994) declared “a national 
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crusade” against the drug cartels and their links to 
various branches of the Mexican government and law 
enforcement agencies (“Mexico: Damage limitation,” 1993). 
By the end of his administration, one hundred commandants 
and federal agents from all over the country had been fired 
after being charged with working for the drug cartels 
(Blancornelas, 2002). However, this group represented just 
the tip of the iceberg. President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de 
León (1994–2000), who succeeded Salinas, increased the use 
of the armed forces for anti-drug tasks and continued to 
purge the federal police. By the end of his administration, 
the ranks of the PGR had been thinned down from almost 
4,000 to about 1,000 agents countrywide (Artz, 2000; 
Ravelo, 2006). In an effort to deal with the weakening of 
the PGR, the Mexican government commissioned army troops to 
work as PGR agents. However, once cut away from the army, 
some of these troops were coerced by the drug cartels and 
later on formed the leadership of a powerful group of 
killers, called “Los Zetas,” that worked for, and 
eventually rose to increasing prominence within, the Gulf 
Cartel.  
Meanwhile, the outcome of the meeting of the major 
drug traffickers in the 1980s in Acapulco, referred to 
earlier, was that the country was divided into seven 
regions, each controlled by a different drug cartel 
(Blancornelas, 2002). The agreement was that every group 
could transport drugs wherever it liked, but it would have 
to pay “taxes” to the “owner” of the territory through 
which it transited (Blancornelas). However, according to 
Jesús Blancornelas, this arrangement did not keep the peace 
for long because drug cartels started to cheat each other 
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to avoid paying “taxes.” In a scenario without a strong 
actor (formal or informal), who could have encouraged the 
agreement this was the outcome to be expected. Thus, 
according to Blancornelas, the surge in drug-related 
violence can be track back to 1988, when a member of the 
Arrellano Felix Cartel (AFC), based in Tijuana, killed a 
member of the Sinaloa Cartel (SC) and then, in an alleged 
effort to avoid retaliation, also killed the brother and 
father of the Sinaloa cartel member he assassinated. 
Once the turf wars between cartels began, retaliatoral 
acts increased in those territories that were being 
contested. By 1999, in Tijuana and the state of Sinaloa 
alone, there were more than 500 deaths directly related to 
the battle between the AFC and the SC (Blancornelas, 2002). 
The main point to note here is that the purge of the 
federal police agencies in the 1980s, which broke their 
linkages to and the protection they provided the cartels, 
combined with the ever-increasing demand for drugs in the 
United States, and a shift from the Caribbean routes to 
Mexican routes for smuggling drugs into the United States, 
along with the waning of the PRI, produced an uneven but 
clear trend towards increased levels of violence between 
the cartels. Thus, the most recent violence is not “new”; 
with ups and downs, the current cycle goes back at least 
twenty years or more and, to a certain degree, is inherent 
to and can be considered a structural aspect of the illegal 
drug trade. At the same time, as we approach the end of the 
first decade of the twenty-first century, new factors have 
come into play to fan the flames of drug-related violence. 
For example, although Mexico has become the main conduit 
for drugs into the United States, violence has also clearly 
 25
risen because of an expanding struggle over access to the 
growing and increasingly lucrative markets for illegal 
drugs within Mexico itself. 
G. NAFTA AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN MEXICO 
One of the first steps towards neoliberal reforms took 
place in 1986, when Mexico joined the General Agreement on 
Tariff and Trade (GATT). The agriculture sector, which had 
once made Mexico self-sufficient in food thanks to tariff 
barriers, subsidies and other protective mechanisms, was  
thrown open to the laws of the free market by the late 
1980s (Ita, 2009). Small-scale producers, who used to focus 
on local markets, could not always compete with their U.S. 
counterparts (McDonald, 2005). The loss of jobs in the 
countryside, as a result of these neoliberal reforms, 
tended to favor those who grew marijuana over those who 
grew corn (McDonald). Consequently, it appears that people 
who did not leave the rural areas were more easily tempted 
to participate in the illegal drug trade. The 
disproportionate pricing between the legal and illegal 
crops, along with the lack of a strong state presence, made 
the decision simple; as Maria Celia Toro  has observed, one 
ton of corn was equal in value to one kilo of marijuana by 
the late 1980s (qtd. in Willoughby, 2003). 
GATT and NAFTA also had an impact on the business that 
some illegal organizations were conducting. Before the free 
trade agreements, some organizations were smuggling goods 
from the United States into Mexico. Therefore, when these 
goods became available in Mexico through the legal market, 
these organizations adapted their structures to smuggling 
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drugs instead. It thus was not just factories and legal 
businesses adapting to the new conditions of the market, 
but so were drug cartels. Some were even establishing fake 
businesses along the border in preparation for the opening 
of the U.S. market (“Mexico: Damage limitation,” 1993). 
Thus, while the U.S. Government was successfully cracking 
down on the cocaine routes through the Caribbean in the 
1980s—and the Colombian drug cartels were looking for new 
ways to meet the growing demand for drugs in the United 
States (Meyer et al., 2007)—the Mexican drug cartels were 
in an ideal position to take control of the cocaine market. 
Since cocaine was easier to transport than marijuana, they 
were able to increase the revenues for the Mexican drug 
cartels. 
Even though there is a debate about when the 
democratization process started in Mexico (Velasco, 2005), 
one of the first visible signs, was the election in 1989 of 
the first non-PRI governor. By the 1990s, there were four 
non-PRI governors, and the political power in local 
congresses was becoming more evenly balanced (Velasco). 
This new reality helped reduce the power of the president 
and created a political vacuum that was filled by the 
governors, who gained greater power and political 
bargaining capabilities (Rascon, 2008). 
The drug cartels adapted to all of these changes. As 
Astorga Almanza points out, the drug cartels eventually 
realized that they did not have to subordinate themselves 
to the control of corrupt government authorities (qtd. in 
Willoughby, 2003). This shift started at the local level, 
as control over local elites and police organizations 
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became more important for drug traffickers than the 
previous need for connections to authorities at the federal 
level (A. Mendéz, 2009). This does not mean that the 
cartels stopped trying to bribe high-ranking officers in 
the government. Instead, it means that it became cheaper 
and more effective to bribe, or co-opt, local police and 
municipal authorities (and thus control entire towns) 
because, at the end of the day, high-ranking officials do 
not control what police officers on the ground actually do 
or do not do. 
H. THE PAN IN THE PRESIDENCY 
In 2000, after a 70-year monopoly of political power 
nationwide and of the presidency in particular, the PRI was 
defeated at the ballot box. Vicente Fox Quesada of the 
Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) became the first non-PRI 
president of Mexico since the Mexican Revolution. His 
accession took place against the backdrop of high levels of 
violence between the drug cartels (Ravelo, 2006). In this 
context, President Fox announced that he would work to 
dismantle the network of government corruption and 
organized crime. He characterized this network and the 
violence associated with it as among the gravest threats 
that Mexico faced at the start of the new millennium 
(Moore, 2000). One of his first actions when he assumed 
office was to declare his own “war on drugs,” sending a 
contingent of Federal Preventive Police (PFP) troops to the 
northwestern border city of Tijuana (Fernández Menéndez, 
2001).  
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President Fox was hampered by having to deal with a 
congress in which no single political party held a 
majority, while the PRI remained a strong political force 
in congress and at the state and municipal level. Despite 
these constraints, his “war on drugs” was viewed as a 
success internationally (Smith, 2002). By 2002, as a result 
of the “war on drugs,” 40 drug cartel leaders had been 
arrested and a government-corruption network of 22 senior 
officials from the PGR had been dismantled (Smith). 
However, the vacuum that these arrests created was either 
quickly filled by members of these same cartels, or rival 
cartels took advantage of the opportunity to expand their 
areas of influence. 
At the same time, other problems were becoming 
increasingly apparent. The demand for illegal drugs in 
Mexico almost doubled between 1988 and 2002 (“El consumo de 
drogas en México,” 1998; Estados Unidos Mexicanos Consejo 
Nacional Contra las Adicciones [CONADIC], 2002). Yet, 
rehabilitation programs were underfinanced, and the 
managers of these programs complained about the general 
lack of support for attacking the demand side of the 
problem (“Mexico: New drugs strategy,” 2002). Although the 
Mexican drug cartels, taken together, were estimated to 
make on average $30 billion a year (Cevallos, 2002), the 
main beneficiaries were the large-scale distributors and 
transporters rather than the peasants and workers employed 
in processing or producing the various drugs. According to 
the Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL) the growth, 
harvesting, processing, and production of drugs were taking 
place in some of the poorest parts of Mexico. The Mexican 
government was concerned that a strong eradication 
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campaign, without the provision of serious alternative 
options for the peasants and workers involved, would worsen 
already high levels of poverty, which, in turn, would bring 
its own set of problems (“Mexico: New drugs strategy”). 
Even though the increase in drug seizures in Mexico 
during Fox’s presidency was estimated by the Mexican 
government to have produced losses of more than $17 billion 
for the drug cartels (Estados Unidos Mexicanos Procuraduría 
General de la República [PGR], 2006, p. 51), and the 
extradition of more than two hundred drug cartel members to 
the United States was viewed as a great success (United 
States House of Representatives [HR], 2007), the overall 
impact on the illegal drug trade was actually negligible. 
In the last two years of President Fox’s administration, 
the production of drugs in Mexico, and the price for 
cocaine and methamphetamine being sold in the United 
States, remained constant (PGR; United States Department of 
Justice [DOJ], 2008a; DOJ, 2008b). However, levels of drug-
related violence reached record highs as the cartels 
increasingly fought against the government and each other, 
and successive struggles were carried on between them. 
When President Felipe Calderón Hinojosa won the 
presidential elections in 2006, the situation that he faced 
was not much different from that of his predecessor. He did 
not have a majority in Congress; the Democratic Revolution 
Party (PRD) had done well and the PRI remained an important 
political force. Drug cartel-related deaths in 2006 
numbered more than 2,000 (“Se logro frenar y revertir,” 
2007). As a result, 10 days after he assumed office, 
President Calderón ordered a joint operation in the state 
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of Michoacán, which became the first of several counterdrug 
operations throughout the country led by the Mexican armed 
forces (Ravelo, 2007). 
By early 2009, the Mexican army had deployed more than 
46,000 troops in counterdrug operations; that number 
represents 23% of the entire Mexican army (more if it is 
measured as a percentage of the operational units only) 
(Estados Unidos Mexicanos Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional 
[SEDENA], 2009a). Meanwhile, not altogether surprisingly, 
drug-related violence in Mexico rose from more than 2,500 
deaths in 2007 to more than 5,600 deaths in 2008 
(“Ejecutados en el Gobierno de Calderón,” 2009).  
Despite the major focus placed on combating the 
cartels, by the Fox and Calderón administrations, the core 
of the Mexican government anti-drug strategy has not 
changed over the years. The supply-reduction approach, with 
the decapitation of the drug cartels as its main focus, has 
produced few tangible results as far as reducing the supply 
of, or demand for, illegal drugs in Mexico. The demand for 
drugs in Mexico and drug-related violence have been 
increasing in Mexico for at least the last twenty years 
(Blancornelas, 2002; CONADIC, 2002; CONADIC, 2008), giving 
birth to what are now more or less permanent turf wars 
between the major drug cartels. 
I. CONCLUSION 
The history of the illegal drug trade in Mexico, from 
the early twentieth century to the twentieth-first century, 
has been shaped by complex social, economic, and political 
processes. Over the years, the drug cartels have been able 
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to survive and adapt at a faster rate than has the Mexican 
government. While the Mexican government has been using the 
same anti-drug strategy over the years—focusing on a 
“frontal assault” on the main drug cartels—the drug cartels 
themselves have modified their organizations, their 
relations with the state, and their relations with society.  
The evolution of the illegal drug trade in Mexico was 
not planned, but one crucial factor shaping its evolution 
has been the continued reliance on anti-drug policies that 
have proved to be ineffective over the years. The way the 
Mexican government has measured the success of its anti-
drug strategy has made it think that it need only do more 
of the same. However, as the next chapter will demonstrate, 
there are structural issues related to the supply-reduction 
approach that Mexico has been using over the years that 
have not allowed—and will not allow—better outcomes in 
Mexico’s fight against the illegal drug trade.    
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III. REASONS AND RESULTS: CURRENT POLICY TOWARD THE 
ILLEGAL DRUG TRADE IN MEXICO 
As noted in the previous chapter, Mexico has 
essentially followed the main international approach taken 
against drugs over the past century. During this time, 
Mexico has based its anti-drug policies on a supply-
reduction approach. The aim of the supply-reduction 
approach is to diminish the supply side of the illegal drug 
trade, based on the assumption that this will, in turn, 
reduce or eliminate access to and use of illegal drugs 
among the populace. The results achieved by the Mexican 
government using this approach do not much differ from 
those elsewhere in the world. Even though the considerable 
resources expended in this fight may not have been totally 
wasted, the goal of creating a society free of illegal 
drugs is nowhere in sight. In fact, as in the case of 
numerous other countries, Mexico is increasingly suffering 
from the negative effects of rising levels of illegal drug 
trafficking and use. The supply-oriented, anti-drug policy, 
which in Mexico involves attacking the powerful drug 
cartels head-on, has reached its structural limits. The 
signs are clear that it is time to try a new approach. 
Even though the Mexican government has been praised 
for its commitment to fighting the drug cartels, it is 
difficult to determine who is winning on this particular 
front of the larger war on drugs. The issue is not a lack 
of sincerity on the part of the Mexican authorities; on the 
contrary, the commitment expressed in this fight is clear. 
Yet, sustained willingness to fight against the drug 
cartels has not diminished the scope and scale of their 
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operations despite high levels of mortality and 
incarceration.  The Mexican government can point to the 
capture or killing of large numbers of drug traffickers, 
but it cannot declare victory. In fact, it is not clear it 
knows what victory should or would look like. Indeed, the 
Mexican Government has focused so much effort on fighting 
the drug cartels in frontal attacks, that it has paid 
little attention to the roots of its drug-related problems. 
The violence associated with the drug cartels, and the 
growth in their size, are symptoms of a bigger illness—
namely, the addiction of people to illegal drugs and the 
social costs associated with widespread illegal drug use. 
Along with these, are the social processes that encourage 
people to participate in the illegal drug trade, and that 
focus directly or indirectly for the major drug cartels.  
A. LAW ENFORCEMENT AND SUPPLY REDUCTION 
At the broadest level, there are, as most policy-
makers know, two main approaches to developing an overall 
anti-drug strategy and the tactics that go with it. One of 
these is the supply-reduction approach that has underpinned 
the “war on drugs” for decades, and is based on the logic 
that if the drugs are not available they cannot do any 
harm. On the other hand, there is the harm-reduction 
approach that assumes that the illegal drug trade is 
already established, and regardless of how much effort goes 
into trying to constrain or stop it, the drugs will still 
get through. The logic behind the harm-reduction approach 
is that there is a need to reduce the harm that illegal 
drugs are causing now, rather than waiting for some point 
in the future when the supply-reduction approach finally 
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produces results. Although many observers draw a sharp 
distinction between the two approaches, it is worth noting 
that both borrow important elements from each other. The 
main difference between them is the level of resources 
spent on targeting drug traffickers and crop eradication, 
compared to investing in “education, prevention, treatment 
and harm reduction” (Roberts, Trace, and Axel, 2004, p. 1). 
1. Supply Reduction 
The supply-reduction approach has its roots in the 
early twentieth century. It emerged as a response to the 
Chinese opium “epidemic,” and proved successful in 
containing and even reducing (but never eliminating) the 
demand for that drug, as well as others late on (United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2008). According 
to UNODC, the illegal drug trade worldwide has remained 
stable since the 1990s. Given that the population has 
continued to grow, this means that the illegal drug trade 
is still very much an expanding business, both in Mexico 
and worldwide. If this is the case, then it is also 
possible to argue that the supply-reduction approach is not 
completely useless; however, it is important to recognize 
that the supply-reduction approach can also be said to have 
reached its structural limit. That is, it is not actually 
reducing supply; at best, it is simply containing it. 
Even if the supply-reduction approach can be credited 
with stabilizing, although not reducing, supply (and this 
is a subject of ongoing debate), emphasis on attacking the 
production and distribution side of the illegal drug trade 
clearly fails to attach sufficient importance to addressing 
the source of the problem demand. As a result, simply going 
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after the supply has not been, and never will lead to the 
elimination of the market for illegal drugs because the 
demand that drives the market remains in place (Buxton, 
2006). In addition to the limitations inherent in the 
supply-reduction approach to combating illegal drugs, the 
illegal drug trade also  brings with it a range of negative 
effects, or “unintended consequences” (“Effective drug law 
enforcement,” 2009, p. 2). 
The most obvious of these unintended consequences is 
the development and growth of black markets created to feed 
the demand for illegal drugs. In turn, these black markets 
are controlled by the organized crime groups that are the 
main sources of the violence related to the illegal drug 
trade. In addition, police action against these groups 
often triggers a violent response (Wilson and Stevens, 
2008). Another unintended consequence is the “balloon 
effect,” which refers to the fact that successful police 
actions in particular areas or against particular links in 
the illegal drug trade push the trade and its problems to 
other areas. The classic example of this is the way in 
which successful U.S. interdiction of cocaine coming into 
the United States via Caribbean routes simply pushed the 
cocaine trade to develop routes via Mexico. Or, as has also 
been seen, the successful eradication of coca in one region 
or country encourages an increase in coca growing in 
another region or country.  
A third unintended consequence of the supply-reduction 
approach is “policy displacing.” This refers to the high 
costs of implementing supply-reduction policies, which 
result in the lack of resources available to be invested in 
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programs that might help address the root causes of the 
illegal drug trade. Finally, and related to this last 
problem, the supply-reduction approach tends to marginalize 
drug users. Therefore, it became more difficult to develop 
effective rehabilitation programs. For example, Adriana 
Martínez, the manager of a government-based drug 
rehabilitation program, has pointed out that one of the 
obstacles to opening new drug rehabilitation centers is the 
opposition by communities to having addicts near their 
homes (qtd. in R. Rodríguez, 2009). It is important to also 
note that these unintended consequences can be found taking 
effect from the local level up through the international 
level.  
2. Harm Reduction 
As mentioned previously, the harm-reduction approach 
does recognize the importance of supply-reduction actions. 
However, the harm-reduction approach tends to incorporate a 
more realistic vision of the illegal drug trade, in that it 
accepts the fact that a world without illegal drugs is 
impossible to achieve, regardless of the amount of 
resources applied to such a project. The harm-reduction 
approach sees drug supply reduction as simply one of 
several “means of reducing drug-related harm, and not as an 
end in itself” (Trace, Roberts, and Klein, 2004, p. 2). 
Another important difference between the supply- and harm-
reduction approaches is in the way that each approach 
evaluates progress. The supply-reduction approach tends to 
evaluate the progress of an anti-drug policy in terms of 
amounts of illegal drugs seized, the number of drug dealers 
captured, and/or the number of successful interdiction 
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operations carried out over a given period of time. The 
harm-reduction approach, by contrast, does not draw a 
direct link between the supply-reduction measures cited 
above and the reduction of harm related to illegal drugs. 
For example, the spread of illness through the exchange of 
infected needles by drug users is not just a matter of the 
number of drug users. It also reflects hygiene measures 
that drug users might or might not take (Trace et al.). 
Therefore, what the harm-reduction approach first seeks is 
to identify the main ways in which harm occurs, and then 
measure progress based on the reduction of harm (“What is 
harm reduction?” 2006). 
Although each country might identify particular types 
of drug harm differently, Robert MacCoun and Peter Reuter 
establish four categories of harm: “health, social and 
economic functioning, safety and public order, and criminal 
justice” (qtd. in Roberts, Klein, and Trace, 2004, p. 9). 
Ironically, law enforcement, as has already been suggested, 
can be a source of harm in various ways. For instance, law 
enforcement can have a negative impact on those local 
economies that rely on the illegal drug trade (Poret, 
2009). The classification system outlined by MacCoun and 
Reuter allows governments to develop policies that 
encourage the use of all the means of the state working in 
concert. Also, having an anti-drug policy that is based on 
clear goals that will result in harm-reduction allows 
governments to adapt or drop those programs that are not 
contributing to these goals. For example, if the main 




drug trade, but the actions carried out by the government 
are not achieving that goal, then maybe they need to be 
altered or eliminated, or at least improved. 
B. WHO IS WINNING THE “WAR ON DRUGS” IN MEXICO? 
Even though the Mexican National Development Plan 
2006–2012 includes harm-reduction as part of its overall 
strategy to address the illegal drug trade, the way that 
the resources provided by the Merida Plan (U.S. counter-
drug assistance) will be expended, makes clear that Mexico 
is a practitioner of the supply-reduction approach to the 
“war on drugs” (HOR, 2009; United States Department of 
State [DOS], 2009). As a matter of fact, the term “war on 
drugs” is widely used in Mexico in reference to the current 
government’s actions against the illegal drug trade, in 
particular against the drug cartels. However, the concept 
of war implies a victory; therefore, winners and losers are 
to be expected. Perhaps not surprisingly, the violence 
related to the battle with and within the drug cartels is 
regularly used in Mexico by those who oppose the current 
strategy to argue that the Mexican government is losing its 
war on drugs (Carrasco Araizaga, 2009). In contrast, the 
Mexican government maintains that the surge of violence 
related to the drug cartels is, instead, a sign of 
desperation by the drug cartels given the effectiveness of 
government efforts (Martínez, 2009). However, neither side 
in this debate is in a position to substantiate its claims, 
because neither party has established what the victory in 
the war on drugs should look like. 
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The main problem that the Mexican authorities face in 
making a convincing defense of their achievements is that 
they have not outlined clear objectives. It is worth noting 
that, even though the illegal drug trade is considered a 
national security threat, there is no overall anti-drug 
strategy per se in Mexico (Estados Unidos Mexicanos 
Presidencia de la República [Presidencia de la República], 
2009a; PGR, 2009b). According to the President’s office, 
the illegal drug trade in Mexico is just one of several 
manifestations of organized crime; therefore, each 
institution in charge of preserving the rule of law in 
Mexico (e.g. the PGR and the Secretariat of Public Security 
[SSP]), as well as the armed forces have to align its 
institutional goals with the approach to organized crime 
set out in the National Development Plan 2006–2012 
(Presidencia de la República, 2009b). Consequently, 
Mexico’s goals for its war on drugs can be found dispersed 
in the various plans of those institutions responsible for 
preserving the rule of law in Mexico. However, it is not 
quite that simple. 
According to the SSP, the goals that have to be 
achieved to declare victory in the war on drugs can be 
found in the Institutional Program of Public Security 2007–
2012 and in the National Program of Public Security 2008–
2012 (Estados Unidos Mexicanos Secretaría de Seguridad 
Pública [SSP], 2009b); yet, nowhere in these documents can 
any form of measurement be found that would show whether 
the government was having any success in the war on drugs 
(SSP, 2008b). In addition, in its institutional program the 
PGR has combined all types of organized crime into one 
category, without making any distinctions among the wide 
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range of activities or types of organized criminal activity 
that take place in Mexico (PGR, 2008). Therefore, the main 
institutions in charge of public security in Mexico are not 
in a position to determine whether the Mexican government’s 
actions are achieving genuine results in the war on drugs. 
In addition to the SSP and PGR, the Mexican armed 
forces also have a prominent role in the war on drugs. In 
fact, the Ministry of Defense (SEDENA) is probably the only 
institution in Mexico which has set specific goals related 
to the illegal drug trade. However, the way it measures 
success presents some problems (Estados Unidos Mexicanos 
Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional [SEDENA], 2007). For 
example, in 2007, SEDENA’s goals were to carry out “28 
high-impact eradication operations per year” and “reduce by 
70%” the total surface area of illegal crops planted in 
Mexico (SEDENA, 2007, p. 16). However, according to SEDENA 
itself, the total surface area of illegal crops in Mexico 
is unknown (SEDENA, 2009b). Therefore, the size of the 
marijuana and poppy crops destroyed can be measured, but 
cannot be compared to an overall total as that figure is 
unknown.  Furthermore, fluctuations in the amounts of crops 
destroyed over time raise several questions (Figure 1). For 
example, if the Mexican army had the capacity to eradicate 
28,050 hectares of marijuana in 2006, why in 2008 were they 
only capable of eradicating 18,394 hectares? Was this the 
result of fewer hectares of marijuana being harvested in 









28,050 22,953 18,394 
Eradicated 
hectares of poppy 
15,644 11,377 13,189 
Figure 1.   Hectares of Illegal Crops Eradicated by 
SEDENA 2006–2008 (From SEDENA, 2009b) 
Finally, even though all the institutions in charge of 
preserving the rule of law in Mexico agree on the 
relationship between social factors and criminal conduct, 
SEDESOL, which is one of several institutions in charge of 
addressing social issues, is not part of the National 
Council of Public Security (CNSP), which is the entity 
responsible for the coordination of all the efforts made by 
the Mexican government in terms of public security (SSP, 
2008a). Thus, by using the “war on drugs” approach, the 
Mexican government may be denying itself the use of other 
powerful support “weapons” in its current war on drugs. 
C. A FRONTAL ATTACK ON THE DRUG CARTELS 
As mentioned before, counter-drug operations are 
framed as part of more general counter-crime strategies. 
Therefore, current counter-drug deployments in Mexico are 
being designed based on the security program of the SSP 
(2007). The security program includes initiatives to 
improve the performance of law enforcement institutions, 
and strengthen the links between law enforcement 
institutions and Mexican society. In addition, the security 
program encourages the development of social programs in 
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other state institutions. Nevertheless, the program mainly 
focuses on interdiction operations and the development of 
new technologies to address and curtail criminal activity 
in Mexico. Therefore, it has not been able to address 
issues such as reducing violence and the operation of local 
illegal drug markets, or reducing the capacity of the drug 
cartels to recruit people. Finally, it has had no impact on 
reversing people’s preference to remain neutral in this 
conflict despite frequent requests for information and 
cooperation by authorities. 
1. Violence and the Local Illegal Drug Market 
Mexico’s approach to address the surge of drug-related 
violence has been the deployment of large contingents of 
federal police and military units into cities and towns, 
where the surge in violence has overwhelmed local 
authorities, or where there is evidence that drug cartels 
have infiltrated those authorities. Usually, these 
deployments are able to diminish the violence for short 
periods of time (A. Cano, 2009c), until the criminals learn 
from government tactics and adapt their own. The capacity 
of the drug cartels to adapt has made this approach very 
inefficient in terms of cost-benefits, to the point that it 
is unsustainable (L. Cano, 2009b). 
However, the foregoing does not mean that the Mexican 
authorities have not been able to arrest some illegal crop 
farmers, or drug cartel members. To the contrary, it is 
worth noting that federal police and military units on the 
ground have made huge strides in following the strategy 
proposed, and have bravely stood up and sustained 
significant casualties. For instance, in 2008 the Mexican 
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government detained more than 20,000 people in relation to 
illegal drug trafficking offenses (PGR, 2009a). More than 
three hundred of these individuals were key members of the 
major drug cartels (Otero, 2009b). In addition, more than 
eight hundred police officers at all jurisdictional levels 
have been arrested on corruption charges, among them a 
former commissioner of the PFP (Ordaz, 2008). 
However, as previously mentioned, the numbers of 
arrests, do not, on their own, translate into results, 
particularly if the main goal is the reduction of violence. 
In fact, the use of the number of arrests and drug seizures 
as an indicator of success can create competition among law 
enforcement institutions, thereby increasing violence and 
undermining ongoing investigations. An emphasis on arrests 
and drug seizures puts pressure on commanders on the ground 
to hunt for targets of opportunity, despite ongoing 
investigations or without taking into account what the 
secondary effects of the arrest might be. In addition, 
experience has shown that the incarceration of drug 
traffickers has limited impact on the illegal drug market 
(Bewley-Taylor, Hallam, and Allen, 2009). It is worth 
noting that, without targeting the roots of each particular 
illegal market, every arrest creates a vacuum that is going 
to be filled almost immediately, at the same time it can 
generate an increase in violence as new players step 
forward to replace those arrested. Therefore, state 
intervention might be indirectly acting as “a major 
contributor or cause of urban violence” (Stevens, Bewley-
Taylor, and Dreyfus, 2009, p. 10). 
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According to Genaro García Luna, the Mexican Secretary 
of Public Security, the rise in violence is a result of the 
fight to control the growing internal illegal drug market 
that has doubled in the last four years (“México duplicó 
consumo,” 2009). His assertion is supported by the high 
number of retail drug dealers killed over the last several 
years. In Tijuana, they represent 90% of the total number 
of people killed in drug-related violence (“Narcomenudistas 
el blanco,” 2009; Castillo García, 2009b). It is worth 
noting that more than 50% of the final retail cost of 
illegal drugs is said to reflect the cost of the risks 
involved in selling to users at the street level (Wilson 
and Stevens, 2008). Again, current government actions and 
inter-cartel violence might make the business more risky, 
but also more lucrative. In other words, higher risks are 
directly related to higher revenues, which might in turn 
make the illegal drug selling business even more 
attractive. 
At present, Mexico’s illegal drug market consumes a 
total of five hundred tons of illegal drugs, which 
represents a yearly profit of $400 million (Otero, 2009a). 
Tijuana alone has a potential illegal drug market of 
100,000 to 200,000 addicts. Most of them come from and/or 
live in the poorest neighborhoods of the city. Eighty-five 
percent of them are “Crystal” (methamphetamine) users who 
require at least three doses each day, easily found in one 
of the 4,000 “narcotienditas” (drug dealing corner shops) 
in the city, which, it is estimated, can provide the 
Tijuana cartel (or whoever controls the plaza) with gross 
revenues of almost $2 million every day (Garduño, 2009). 
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It is worth noting that the large and growing internal 
drug market, such as the one in Tijuana, is not just a 
security problem given drug-related crime, but it is also a 
public health problem. Patricia Case et al. (2008) 
concluded that Tijuana is already experiencing a 
“methamphetamine outbreak . . . with the concomitant 
consequences already experienced (earlier) in the United 
States” (p.30). Most of the crystal addicts in Tijuana use 
needles to inject the drug (IDUs) and thus engage in needle 
sharing, dramatically increasing the risk of serious 
diseases such as HIV/AIDS. Simon D. W. Frost et al. (2006) 
found that the prevalence of hepatitis C, HIV/AIDS, and 
syphilis among drug addicts in Tijuana was 96%, 2%, and 
13%, respectively in 2006. 
Even though the rising demand for illegal drugs in 
Mexico helps explain the current surge of violence, as the 
Secretary of Public Security has pointed out, it is only 
part of the explanation. It is clear that the drug cartels 
are fighting each other for greater control over a 
lucrative and growing illegal drug market. However, what is 
encouraging people to work for or join the drug cartels in 
the first place? As Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman, and 
Norman Loayza (2002) noted several years ago, there is a 
direct link between social inequality and violent crimes. 
Even though high-level government employees and business 
people have been arrested for their links to the drug 
cartels, most of the people who work in the illegal drug 
trade are from poor backgrounds. Therefore, high levels of 
inequality and poverty in Mexico might be playing an 
important role in the surge of drug-related violence 
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because drug cartels offer an attractive source of work 
that has remained unaffected by the current economic crisis 
(Gómez, 2009a).  
2. Joining the “Dark Side” 
According to SEDENA, there are at least 500,000 people 
directly involved at some stage of the illegal drug supply 
chain; 300,000 are producers, 160,000 are distributors, 
retail drug dealers and informants, and 40,000 are part of 
the chain of command of the various drug cartels (Merlos, 
2008). It is important to make a distinction between these 
three groups because of the way in which the illegal drug 
trade influences communities, and the way in which it draws 
people into the business differs. In small, poor 
communities in the sierra (mountains), the choice for 
peasants between growing illegal or legal crops might be 
made in terms of survival. On the other hand, in places 
where distribution is the main activity, where revenues are 
greater, and where a clear sense of relative deprivation 
and/or drug addiction can play a major role in the 
recruitment of youngsters by the drug cartels, most but not 
all are from poor backgrounds. 
In Mexico, just living in an area where illegal crop 
production is widespread does not lead to prosperity. 
People from Sinaloa’s sierra have said that illegal crops 
were the main or only source of income that they had; 
consequently, as a result of the Mexican army’s eradication 
efforts, they lost their jobs, and had not received any 
government support either (A. Cano, 2009a). This is 
supported by INEGI’s statistics that indicate that 68% of 
the communities in Sinaloa’s sierra live in impoverished 
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circumstances (A. Cano, 2009a). In Guerrero, the situation 
is quite similar. Seventy percent of the indigenous people 
live in severe poverty and jobs are scarce. Thus, poppy-
growing represents a major, if not the only option for 
survival (Gómez Durán, 2009). Poppy growing, which usually 
involves all family members, nets between one and one and a 
half dollar for every gram of opium gum produced, in 
contrast to the $30 or $70 that one gram of heroin sells 
for on the streets of Mexico City (Gómez Durán, 2009). 
Once the drugs leave the sierra and the distribution 
starts, the dynamics between the illegal drug trade and the 
communities change. According to Victoria Malkin (2001), 
the distribution of illegal drugs has reshaped the 
traditional patronage system in rural areas. In particular, 
a group of new rich has emerged who tend to provide more 
assistance to their local communities than the old rich 
used to do. As a result, they become role models for some 
people. In addition, James H. McDonald (2005) found that 
the illegal drug trade has put additional stress on 
existing social inequalities in small rural towns. For 
example, he mentions that brand name clothing stores, and 
spas are starting to emerge, and that these stores and 
commodities are out of the reach of regular ranchers and 
their families. He also mentions that narco-money has 
increased the price of land; therefore, people not in the 
illegal drug trade tend to see their chances of acquiring 
their own ranches by legal means reduced. 
In urban areas, where growing consumption and 
distribution of illegal drugs meet, the illegal drug trade 
has become the fast track to wealth and power. According to 
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Julian Leyzaola, director of public security in Tijuana, 
the drug dealers obtain a wage of $20 for each hundred 
doses of methamphetamines sold, and some of them ask for 
drugs rather than money as payment (qtd. in 
“Narcomenudistas el blanco,” 2009). Even though this may 
not seem like a particularly high wage given the risks 
involved, when compared to other low-skill jobs, the 
rewards are high. For example, the wages earned by a retail 
drug dealer represent more than five times what a 
construction worker might earn (“Salarios mínimos,” 2009). 
These high wages allow drug dealers, most of whom are young 
boys, to buy cars, nice clothes, and also to help their 
families with daily expenses; such things make them look 
successful in their communities at the same time their 
image reinforces the sense of relative deprivation felt by 
other youngsters in the community.  
For some youngsters, then, joining a drug cartel has 
obvious and immediate economic benefits, at the same time 
that membership also provides them with a sense of power. 
As Rosalío Reta, a 20-year-old drug cartel killer who 
started his career at the age of 13, told a court when 
referring to one of his 20 assassinations, “It made me feel 
like Superman” (qtd. in Osorno, 2009, p. 23). According to 
the SSP, it takes just three months for a youngster to move 
up in the organization from being a drug dealer or 
informant to becoming a killer or medium-level leader with 
an income of $3,000 per month (Benavides, 2009), in 
contrast with the monthly salary of $750 that a policeman 
in Ciudad Juarez receives (A. Cano, 2009b). 
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The fast promotion rate within the drug cartels can be 
explained in two ways: one, the illegal drug trade is an 
expanding business that requires the same rapid staffing as 
any burgeoning organizational structure; and two, as a 
result of the high rate of deaths and arrests of cartel 
members, the cartels are in constant need of new recruits 
to replace those killed or incarcerated. Against the 
backdrop of these two complementary explanations, it is 
also worth highlighting that the risks associated with the 
government’s ongoing targeting of the traffickers have not 
deterred young people from joining the drug cartels, and 
the fast promotion rate might even be making the drug 
cartels more attractive as employers.  
3. Choosing Sides 
One of the problems that the Mexican government is 
facing in its frontal attack on the drug cartels is the 
lack of information about drug cartels’ operations. This 
lack of information is the result of the poor performance 
of the intelligence services, but also and maybe more 
significantly, it reveals the lack of trust by citizens in 
the authorities.  
In an attempt to overcome the continued lack of 
information, Mexican authorities have launched a rewards 
campaign and lectured communities about their 
responsibility to help the authorities in their current 
efforts (González, 2009). Yet, although most Mexicans 
support counter-drug efforts, the rewards campaign has not 
been as effective as the authorities would have liked 
(Castillo García, 2009c). The failure of the rewards 
campaign can be partially explained because the Mexican 
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drug cartels have built up a network of social support 
(both voluntary and involuntary) that extends well beyond 
the immediate members of the organization. Communities, in 
general, are unwilling to cooperate with the government 
against the cartels out of fear and/or because of the 
income that they derive directly or indirectly from the 
illegal drug trade.  
Unfortunately, drug cartels have built a “credible” 
reputation among the general population. This is because, 
when they issue a threat, they are usually able to carry it 
out. They have even been able to compel several police 
directors to resign their positions (“Renuncia el 
Secretario de Seguridad,” 2009). They have killed senior 
government authorities, journalists, and opponents in a 
cruel manner, and have assaulted small rural towns (“Grupo 
armado toma poblado,” 2009). There is also a feeling in 
those cities and towns where drug cartels operate that they 
have eyes and ears everywhere, and urban legends about 
their atrocities are widespread, reinforcing people’s 
unwillingness to aid the authorities against them (Castillo 
García, 2009a). Meanwhile, Monte Alejandro Rubido García, 
director of the National System of Public Security, has 
declared that this is a fight between the drug cartels and 
authorities (Castillo Garcia, 2009b). One way to interpret 
this is that there is thus no reason for the common citizen 
to put himself in the middle of this fight. 
But it is also a fact that narco-money has long had an 
important impact on local economies and beyond. The drug 
cartels invest their money in “legitimate businesses” to 
launder the revenues coming from the illegal drug trade, 
 52
which in turn creates jobs (Serrano, 2008). According to 
press publications and academic researchers, the 
involvement of narco-money in some local economies accounts 
for 40% to 80% of all economic activity in certain parts of 
the country (Castillo García, 2009d; Ravelo, 2009). With 
this level of linkage to local economies, it is obvious 
that successful counter-drug operations would have a 
negative impact on local economies. At the end of 2008, a 
car dealer in Culiacan complained that car sales had gone 
down as a result of the ratcheting up of the government’s 
counter-drug campaign (Wilkinson, 2008). In addition and as 
mentioned previously, in some communities people involved 
in the illegal drug trade make regular donations to their 
communities and also “protect” them from the incursions of 
rival drug cartels (Maerker, 2009). 
In contrast to the drug cartels’ reputation, many 
members of the police and law enforcement agencies, as well 
as government authorities generally, have low credibility 
because of their poor performance and corruption (SSP, 
2008a). It is worth noting that in Mexico 94% of the crimes 
committed are regular (non-federal) crimes that directly 
impact the common citizen, such as robberies and rapes. 
However, just 21% of the victims report these crimes (SSP). 
In some cases, people’s decisions to report a crime are 
related to other issues, such as insurance claims, rather 
than to any expectation of having the crime solved by the 
authorities. Mexico City’s police department, for instance, 
solves only one in 10 cases that are reported (Cruz Flores, 
2009). 
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This poor level of performance in the realm of public 
security has been the result of years of delay in not just 
modernizating the police, but the entire legal system in 
Mexico (Benítez Manaut, 2009). Although law enforcement 
agencies at the federal level are not immune to 
infiltration by drug cartels or corruption, they have been 
improving in their performance and recruitment mechanisms, 
and have been slowly winning public trust over the last few 
years (SSP, 2008a). However, county police departments have 
shown that they are far from being a reliable force, and 
this is particularly true in the poorest counties. 
The ineffectiveness of county-level authorities has 
had an important negative impact on the current campaign 
against the drug cartels. In a conflict that has 
international reach but local origins, police departments 
at the local level should be playing a major role. The 
police on the street should be the ones leading this fight, 
with the support of the federal government. Instead, local 
police have become just one more enemy of the federal 
government’s counterdrug campaign, and sometimes the only 
thing that distinguishes a county police officer from a 
drug cartel member is his uniform (Gómez, 2009b). Of 
course, it has to be recognized that, for a weak police 
department in a small county, there is usually not much 
space to maneuver when its members are approached by a drug 
cartel. A high-ranking government official with an armed 
escort, an armored vehicle, and a good salary has a choice 
with regard to standing up to the drug cartels. But, for a 
policeman who has to walk to his home in a shantytown 




The dubious results of the supply-reduction approach 
are a clear signal that the current anti-drug policy in 
Mexico has reached its limits and that major revision is 
necessary. The Mexican government and governments all over 
the world should move beyond thinking that a frontal 
assault on the production and trafficking of illegal drugs 
is the right approach. It is well past time for the Mexican 
authorities to evaluate the results that the supply-
reduction approach have had in Mexico over the last 
century, and to rethink Mexico’s anti-drug policy. The 
Mexican authorities’ bold efforts against the drug cartels 
cannot succeed unless the roots of the illegal drug trade 
in Mexico are attacked. Only by addressing the social roots 
of the illegal drug trade will major results be achieved. A 
new integrated approach to the illegal drug trade in Mexico 
might someday make it possible to talk seriously about 
“victory” in the “war on drugs.”  
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IV. SECURITY AND STABILITY: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 
TO THE ILLEGAL DRUG TRADE IN MEXICO 
As we have seen, the Mexican government has been 
fighting the illegal drug trade in almost the same manner 
since the start of the last century. This has involved 
focusing primarily on the drug trafficking organizations 
and paying little attention to the impetuses behind the 
illegal drug trade. However, after decades of drug 
prohibition policies, it might be time for Mexican 
authorities to reevaluate the utility of prohibition, much 
as U.S. authorities did with alcohol over half a century 
ago. In the context of revising and reorienting its anti-
drug policy it is also necessary that the Mexican 
government clearly define its anti-drug goals. The current 
approach of addressing all organized crime in the same 
manner has made authorities lose sight of what an anti-drug 
policy is for. The Mexican government’s main concern should 
be reducing the harmful effects of illegal drugs. This does 
not mean that the Mexican government has to dishonor 
international cooperation related to the illegal drug 
trade. However, the main focus should be on protecting 
Mexican society from harmful social effects of illegal 
drugs, including systemic violence. 
The Mexican government must also bear in mind that it 
is always better and cheaper to encourage preventive 
programs instead of reactive programs. Unless the Mexican 
government is able to understand and defuse the recruitment 
mechanisms of the drug cartels, the latter are going to be 
able to continue to survive and prosper, despite all the 
best efforts of the Mexican authorities. In order to be 
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able to defuse the recruitment “pull,” the Mexican 
government needs to address the social grievances and 
inequalities that have made and continue to make people 
resort to criminal activity to satisfy their basic needs. 
This approach will require rebuilding the social contract 
in Mexico.  
A. SPLITTING THE PROBLEM: THE REGULARIZATION OF MARIJUANA 
One of the main questions that often come up in 
discussions about the illegal drug trade is whether the 
illegal drug trade and its negative effects would exist if 
some drugs had not been prohibited in the first place. The 
best answer to this question is to point to the example of 
alcohol prohibition in the 1920s in the United States 
(prohibition has been tried or advocated in numerous 
countries around the world in the twentieth century). Even 
though alcoholics exist in the United States today, very 
few people believe that prohibition should be encouraged 
again because the negative effects of doing so proved to be 
greater than the benefits from regulating and taxing the 
sale and consumption of alcohol. 
After years of limited results in their fight against 
the illegal drug trade, some countries are trying to find 
the optimal balance between prohibition, decriminalization, 
depenalization, regulation, and taxation. Countries around 
the globe, including the United States, are slowly adopting 
harm-reduction strategies that focus on the social aspects 
of the drug problem (International Drug Policy Consortium 
[IDPC], 2009; “US House of Representatives vote,” 2009). 
These strategies range from the total decriminalization of 
possession and consumption of certain illegal drugs to 
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distinguish between soft and hard drugs, with a much higher 
level of tolerance for the distribution and consumption of 
the former in relation to the latter (“A toker's guide,” 
2009).  
Fortunately, Mexico is not the exception. Just a few 
months ago, a new law was passed that identifies and 
increases the size of the maximum quantity of drugs that 
can be carried by one individual without that individual 
being considered to have committed a crime. This law also 
establishes that drug treatment is “mandatory” (there are 
no fines for non-compliance with this rule) for those who 
get caught carrying the maximum dose three or more times 
(“Aprueba el Senado dosis,” 2009). In addition, the new law 
allows local police departments to prosecute 
narcotrafficking offenses that used to be considered under 
the jurisdiction of the federal police only (“Aprueba el 
Senado dosis”). It is worth noting that at the end of his 
administration, former Mexican president Fox vetoed a 
similar law, due to pressure from the United States 
government (Enriquez, 2006a; Enriquez, 2006b). The passage 
of Mexico’s new possessive law some three years later, and 
the relatively slight opposition voiced by the United 
States this time, may be evidence that even the United 
States is not immune to the trend of finding a better way 
to address the illegal drugs issue. Indeed, President 
Obama’s administration is moving away from the “war on 
drugs” concept (Brooks, 2009), and is starting to pay more 
attention to addressing the drug demand side of the illegal 
drug trade, and to encourage other countries like Mexico to 
do so as well (Olivares Alonso, 2009). 
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Although the new law is considered an important 
initiative, specialists on the illegal drug trade have 
suggested that Mexico should go one step further and 
regulate marijuana in the same way that alcohol and tobacco 
are currently managed in an attempt to reduce the illegal 
drug trade in Mexico and keep most of the Mexican drug 
users away from criminal networks (Arvizu, 2009). The 
decision to focus on the regularization of marijuana over 
other drugs seems to have been made on a cost-benefit 
basis. Although marijuana cannot be considered an innocuous 
drug (there is no wholly innocuous drug), it is certainly 
the least harmful of all the current illegal drugs 
(Feilding et al., 2008). In addition, removing marijuana 
from the illegal drug trade would have a major impact on 
the Mexican drug cartels’ finances and would reduce their 
share of the domestic illegal drugs market because 
marijuana is currently considered responsible for over 61% 
of the Mexican drug cartels’ incomes (E. Mendéz, 2009). In 
addition, discussions over the convenience of regulating 
marijuana are taking place around the world. Thus, it is 
clearly not an initiative that is, or will be, considered 
out of step with the times.  
Even though it is clear that the regularization of 
marijuana would not fix the illegal drug trade in Mexico, 
according to Astorga Almanza (personal communication, 
August 25, 2009) one of the main benefits that can be 
obtained with the regularization of marijuana is that 
Mexican authorities would be allowed to narrow their focus 
on the drug cartels, making better use of the considerable 
resources currently directed towards eradication of 
marijuana operations. He also notes that research on 
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marijuana could once again be carried out in Mexico, which 
prohibition has helped inhibit. Among the other benefits of 
marijuana’s regularization would be the implementation of 
government control over the whole marijuana trade. This 
change would lead to the reinstatement of the legal status 
of all those marijuana farmers who have not committed any 
other major crimes such as murders, which would, in turn, 
reduce the social harm that results from law enforcement 
and improve the government’s image in those areas that have 
reduced working opportunities. At the same time, Astorga 
Almanza points out that the negative effects of marijuana’s 
regulation would not be much different from those Mexico 
already experiences. 
The argument that favors regulation of illegal drugs 
in lieu of prohibition has been strengthened based on 
accumulated evidence worldwide over the last century. In 
this context the decision to maintain the current 
prohibition approach seems to have a political basis. The 
political reasons for maintaining a prohibition approach 
were evidenced when a group of former Latin American 
presidents (including Mexico’s former president Zedillo), 
academics, and intellectuals submitted a paper proposing a 
shift from a supply-reduction approach to a harm-reduction 
approach, including a revision of strategies against the 
cultivation of illicit drugs (Gaviria et al., 2009). The 
former presidents did not have to respond to the pressure 
of constituencies or worry about foreign policy issues when 
they made their statement. 
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Over the last century, the public has been educated on 
the assumption that all illegal drugs are equally bad and 
that the best way to deal with the illegal drug trade is a 
full prohibition approach. For example, when the law 
against illegal drug retail sales and maximum doses was put 
into effect in Mexico, the public was split between those 
who saw the law as a good initiative and those who believed 
that the law was a terrible mistake made by the Mexican 
government (Mejía, 2009). In addition, the United States 
and the United Nations have been pressuring Mexico to 
maintain the prohibition on all illegal drugs. Therefore, 
shifting the paradigm any further than it has already been 
shifted, is not an easy decision for the Mexican 
government. 
Even though, and as previously mentioned, there is 
enough evidence to conclude that the current supply-
reduction approach has reached its structural limits, 
politicians might be cautious about making drastic changes 
because introducing new policies could be interpreted as a 
sign of weakness and defeat. In April 2009, during the 
first debate in the Mexican Congress about the 
regularization of marijuana, most of the politicians, 
regardless of their political party, did not support the 
regulation of marijuana, and 11 out of 18 candidates to 
state governments made clear their opposition to the 
proposal (“¿Legalizar mariguana?,” 2009; E. Mendéz, 2009).  
However, if the Mexican government wants to reduce the 
economic power of the drug cartels and their ability to 
maneuver, as well as lower the harm done by law enforcement 
in rural communities, the regularization of marijuana is an 
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option worth trying. In order to lower the political cost 
of trying it, the Mexican government could encourage more 
public debates about marijuana’s regularization and call 
for a plebiscite after that. The plebiscite would not only 
help lower the political costs of regularization or 
legalization unilaterally; it would also armor the decision 
against foreign pressure. Even in the event that the 
majority voted against the regulation of marijuana, the 
plebiscite would help re-energize the counterdrug campaign 
and provide a catalyst for what has to be an ongoing 
debate. Only with an ongoing debate can we expect some 
movement towards a new and/or more integrated anti-drug 
strategy down the track. 
B. AN INTEGRATED ANTI-DRUG STRATEGY 
As mentioned in Chapter III, the main issue that 
Mexican authorities face in addressing the illegal drug 
trade is the lack of an anti-drug strategy per se. Even 
though the illegal drug trade is one of several expressions 
of organized crime and the drug cartels in Mexico have 
engaged in other organized crime activities, such as 
kidnappings, blackmail, piracy, and prostitution, the 
illegal drug trade remains the main criminal activity of 
the drug cartels and has peculiarities that make it stand 
out from other organized criminal activities. Consequently, 
the goals of an anti-drug strategy are quite different from 
those designed to address other criminal activities. Thus, 
having a general strategy against organized crime has 




achievements against the illegal drug trade nor measure 
their success against other manifestations of organized 
crime. 
In addition, Mexico has stopped being just a transit 
and producer country for the United States’ illegal drug 
market and has become a major consumer country itself. 
Thus, the illegal drug trade is not simply a public 
security issue. The illegal drug trade also affects social 
relations, and it is threatening to become a major public 
health problem in those communities where it has a strong 
presence (Malkin, 2001; McDonald, 2005; Case et al., 2008). 
It should not be up to law enforcement agencies only to 
design Mexico’s anti-drug policy. Mexico cannot afford for 
those ministries in charge of social and public health 
programs to remain low-profile players in the overall anti-
drug strategy. If the illegal drug trade is a national 
security threat, then it has to be treated as one. All the 
resources that the state owns should be used in an 
integrated manner to defuse the threat. 
The current indicators that the Mexican government is 
making progress in its war on drugs, are based on a supply 
approach, are confusing, and reflect several limitations. 
Mike Trace, Marcus Roberts, and Axel Klein (2004) from the 
Beckley Foundation, have proposed a series of objectives 
based on a social harm-reduction approach that might help 
guide the development of an anti-drug policy for Mexico 
(pp. 3–5): 
 Reduce the levels of crime and public nuisance 
associated with the production, supply, purchase, 
and use of drugs. 
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 Reduce the number of deaths that result directly 
from the production, supply, purchase, and use of 
drugs. 
 Reduce the number of people suffering physical 
health problems as a result of the use of drugs, 
particularly HIV and hepatitis infections. 
 Reduce the number of people suffering mental 
health problems and addiction as a result of 
their use of drugs. 
 Reduce the social cost of drug use, including the 
impact on families and children and the numbers 
of people failing in education and employment as 
a result of their use of drugs. 
 Reduce the damage to the environment caused as a 
result of the production, supply, purchase, and 
use of drugs. 
Whatever objectives Mexico decides to use, according 
to Trace, Roberts, and Klein (2004), they have to be 
designed following clear and effective rules. The 
objectives of an anti-drug strategy have to be precise 
while at the same time avoiding strict numeric values and 
due dates. Mexico has been fighting the illegal drug trade 
in one way or another for almost a century, and there is no 
reason to believe that the trade is going to totally 
disappear in the near future. Therefore, the policy must 
include long- and short-term objectives; but, most 
importantly, those objectives have to be developed via 
political consensus across political parties in order to 
survive changes in administrations. And, finally, it has to 
be made clear to all the people involved that an anti-drug 
policy requires adjustments based on outcomes, while 




than making the evaluation methods and data accessible and 
transparent so that the widest range of communities can 
take part in the overall effort. 
C. REDUCING SOCIAL HARM RELATED TO THE ILLEGAL DRUG TRADE 
The main objective of every anti-drug policy, whatever 
approach is used, should be to reduce the harm that the 
illegal drug trade imposes on society. According to 
Sylvaine Poret (2009), the total harm that the illegal drug 
trade imposes on a society is the result of several factors 
added together. However, it is possible to synthesize the 
social harm under two main headings: crime and health. 
1. Drug-Related Crime 
The surge in violence related to the turf wars between 
drug cartels has caused Mexican authorities to focus their 
efforts on law enforcement to deal with the issue. However, 
that is not the only category of drug-related crime. 
According to Goldstein (qtd. in Resignato, 2000), drug-
related crime can be divided into three categories: the 
“systemic violence” that is directly linked with black 
markets and organized crime, for example, the thousands of 
killings in Mexico as a result of turf wars; the “economic 
compulsion” that results from all the criminal activities 
committed by drug users (most of them hard users) in order 
to obtain money to buy illegal drugs; and, finally, the 
“psychopharmacological” results of criminal and/or socially 
harmful offenses committed by people under the influence of 
drugs, for example, car accidents (pp. 681-682). It is 
worth noting that studies have shown that marijuana users 
are not predisposed to violent crime and that most drug-
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related crimes can be attributed to systemic violence 
related to struggles over market control between rival 
organizations (Resignato). In order to properly address 
drug-related crime in Mexico, it is imperative for the 
Mexican authorities to identify what category of drug-
related crime they are dealing with.   
Mexican authorities have to have a clear understanding 
of what is happening in communities in order to choose the 
best approach to deal with each category of drug-related 
crime. That is, while the “best” way to deal with systemic 
violence is by law enforcement, the best way to address 
economic compulsion or desperation is to provide 
rehabilitation programs (Trace et al., 2004). At present, 
federal authorities have not developed enough data to 
identify which category of drug-related crime they are 
facing (PGR, 2009b; Estados Unidos Mexicanos Secretaría de 
Salud [SS], 2009; SSP, 2009a). Thus, Mexican authorities 
typically use the same strategy to address all categories 
of drug-related crime. 
It is a fact that the most evident drug-related crimes 
in Mexico grow out of rivalry over market control. But 
systemic violence is inherent to the illegal drug trade. 
Thus, neither a “frontal attack” on the drug cartels nor 
the arrest or killing of drug cartel leaders is going to 
end the violence. The question of how much systemic 
violence is “acceptable” is difficult to answer. According 
to the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), a rate of 
cero to five murders per 100,000 inhabitants is normal, 
from five to eight is grave, and above eight is considered 
an epidemic (Kliksberg, 2007).  
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However, the PAHO does not make any distinctions 
between the causes of the murders. Therefore, PAHO’s 
criminality index might not be helpful for establishing the 
“acceptable” level of systemic violence. For example, a 
comment made by Eduardo Medina Mora, the Mexican attorney 
general, in which he highlighted a decline in the murder 
rate, still made him a target for severe criticism in 
Mexico. According to Medina Mora, the security situation in 
Mexico is better now than it was fifteen years ago, when 
the murder rate was 18 per 100,000 inhabitants; it was 10.7 
in 2008 (qtd. in J. Rodríguez, 2009) Perhaps not 
uncoincidentally, according to Blancornelas (2002), the 
surge in the violence between drug cartels started during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Consequently, it is not 
clear whether reducing the number of murders related to 
systemic drug-related violence from thousands to hundreds 
would be more acceptable to Mexicans or whether reaching a 
murder rate below eight by reducing the number of “violent” 
murders would make any difference to perception about the 
level of violence. More research needs to be done in order 
to better understand how systemic violence impacts Mexican 
society. 
Even though it is not clear how much systemic drug-
related violence would be “acceptable” in Mexico, it is 
certainly a fact that less would be better. Ric Curtis and 
Travis Wendel (qtd. in Stevens et al., 2009) have suggested 
that illegal drug markets respond quickly to police 
activities. Therefore, authorities might shape the behavior 
of the drug cartels by sending the right signals. For 
example, if there are turfs wars between cartels, 
government actions might encourage each organization to 
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remain in its “traditional” territory. This does not mean 
that Mexican authorities should constrain themselves from 
attacking the drug cartels; on the contrary, the Mexican 
government has to strengthen its local authorities to be 
able to act as strong “referees,” thereby maintaining 
territorial pressure on the drug cartels. However, Mexican 
authorities should do this wisely and as part of a 
coordinated strategy to reduce the violence, not simply 
destroy criminal organizations, which then creates a vacuum 
that invariably leads to new turf wars. However, this kind 
of strategy requires close interagency coordination and the 
constant evaluation of targets; unilateral operations would 
be the exception, not the rule. 
It is important to bear in mind that once an 
individual joins a drug cartel, there is not much that the 
Mexican authorities can do to reverse that individual’s 
overall path in life, or those around him. Members of the 
drug cartels, like members of guerrilla organizations, 
obtain their resources and live among the population. Most 
of the people that drug cartels recruit come from 
disadvantaged sectors of Mexican society (in urban 
environments street gangs are a major conduit for 
recruitment) and many recruits get their start as young as 
13, and sometimes even younger (Díaz, 2008). Bernardo 
Kliksberg (2007) and the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID, 2006) have noted that 
crime prevention programs supported by law enforcement have 
worked better at reducing crime in Latin America than those 
approaches that emphasize law enforcement. Thus, Mexican 
authorities need to pay more attention to addressing the 
causes that drag people into criminal conduct while, at the 
same time, opening up more options for those who may be 
looking for a way to get out of a life of crime. This may 
require programs that do not rely on people giving up the 
names of other members of their former organization, along 
the lines of a witness protection program. Unless the 
Mexican authorities understand and develop the right 
mechanisms to address the causes of why gang members 
(Figure 2) and other people join the drug cartels, systemic 
violence is not going to be reduced in Mexico. 
 
Figure 2.   The Vicious Cycle of Central American and 
Mexican Gangs (From USAID, 2006, p. 13) 
With regard to the other two categories of drug-
related crime, “economic compulsion” and 
“psychopharmacological,” studies have shown that prevention 
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and rehabilitation programs offer the most cost-effective 
methods for addressing these categories (Rydell, Caulkins, 
and Everingham, 1996; Stevens, Trace and Bewley-Taylor, 
2005). Even though rehabilitation programs cannot, by 
themselves, eliminate drug-related crime (they need to be 
supported by social and law enforcement programs), they are 
less expensive to implement than supply-reduction 
approaches and can achieve better results in reducing 
consumption by heavy users who are most predisposed to 
carry on economic-compulsion types of criminal behavior 
(Rydell et al.).  
To put this in perspective, it is worth mentioning 
that in 2008 the Mexican government was able to start the 
construction of 300 rehabilitation centers with an 
investment of $50 million that came from the biggest drug-
related cash seizure in the world ($205 million) (R. 
Rodríguez, 2008). In contrast, an airplane for maritime 
patrolling, that Mexico plans to buy with U.S. funds 
provided by the Merida Plan, will cost $60 million (Gomora, 
2009). Arguably, 300 rehabilitation centers would have a 
far greater impact on containing the negative results of 
the illegal drug trade than one airplane aimed at 
interdiction. For example, Mary Layne et al. (2001) 
conclude that interdiction operations have limited outcomes 
due to the high adaptation capacity of the traffickers. As 
such an example makes clear, a shift away from supply-
reduction and interdiction toward addressing the social 
costs and consequences of the illegal drug trade would not 
only prove more effective, but would not necessarily be a 
significant drain on government resources, particularly 
given the long-term social benefits. 
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2. Health 
As mentioned previously, prevention and rehabilitation 
programs in Mexico have never been top priorities for the 
Mexican government. In a country with limited resources, as 
Mexico is, this might represent a classic instance of a 
policy displacement effect. According to José Ángel Córdova 
Villalobos (qtd. in R. Rodríguez, 2008), the Mexican 
minister of public health, it was not until Mexico netted 
$50 million in illegal drug trade cash that it was able to 
reorganize the federal prevention and rehabilitation 
programs. At the state level, things are not much 
different. According to Víctor Valencia de los Santos (qtd. 
in L. Cano, 2009a), the minister of public security from 
the northern state of Chihuahua (Ciudad Juarez is located -
in Chihuahua State), the number of addicts in his state is 
a grave public health issue that has not been addressed in 
a proper manner. 
The systemic violence and the supply-reduction 
approach have relegated prevention and rehabilitation 
programs to a secondary role in Mexico’s anti-drug policies 
over the years. Yet, at the end of the day, drug users on 
both sides of the U.S.–Mexican border are the ones who are 
driving the illegal drug trade. That is, drug cartels might 
be able to coerce some Mexican authorities, kill their 
rivals, and so on, but they do all this in order to reach 
their clients, the drug users. Ironically, drug users are 
not coerced to use illegal drugs. The Mexican authorities 
need to recognize that the reason for the turf wars between 
drug cartels is over local markets (“México duplicó 
consumo,” 2009). While the United States needs to focus on 
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its citizens’ drug demands in order to reduce the strength 
of the Mexican drug cartels (“Consumo en EU,” 2009). 
Mexican authorities need to fight the growing drug demand 
in Mexico with the same intensity that it displays when 
fighting the drug cartels (and it should at least be hoped 
that someday the United States will switch from a futile 
preoccupation with stopping supply and focus on the social 
problems related to the demand for illegal drugs). Further, 
addressing drug demand helps address a public health issue, 
as described above. Indeed, it is especially important to 
treat drug demand as a public health issue in order to 
destigmatize drug users and make their access to treatment 
easier (O'Loughlin, 2007). 
As with other public health issues, drug demand has to 
be addressed at all stages in order to reduce the social 
harms of illegal drug use. In 2007, the Mexican government 
launched the prevention program “Escuela Segura” (Safe 
School) to reduce violence and the use of illegal drugs 
among basic-level students (“Escuela segura,” 2008). 
Escuela Segura is probably the most important prevention 
program yet implemented by the Mexican government because 
it recognizes for the first time that there is a high risk 
of drug addiction among students in Mexico (Solera, 2009). 
However, two years after being launched there has been 
severe criticism even within the Mexican government 
regarding implementation of this program ("Cobija Escuela 
Segura,” 2008; Solera). Even though the program is too new 
to evaluate its impact on drug demand, the indicators used 
to evaluate the performance of the program have not been of 
much help. For example, the number of schools in the 
program grew from 1,715 in 2007 to more than 15,000 in 2009 
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(Estados Unidos Mexicanos Secretaría de Educación Pública 
[SEP], 2009). However, having more schools in the program 
does not show improvements per se. Thus, the Mexican 
government must find other ways to evaluate the program and 
make adjustments in order to ensure it works as was 
planned.  
According to the Mexican Institute for the Prevention 
and Addictions Attention, if people avoid acquiring a drug 
addiction between the ages of 14 and 18, the risk of 
developing a drug habit diminishes by about 80% (qtd. in 
Solera, 2009). However, Mexican authorities have to take 
into account that addiction is not the only harm that drug 
users are exposed to. HIV, hepatitis, and sexually 
transmitted diseases are also associated with unsafe 
illegal drug use. Thus, ways to avoid contagious diseases 
should be part of the drug prevention program’s curricula. 
Although abstention is the best way to avoid drug 
harm, the facts indicate that abstention is not always 
possible (Estados Unidos Mexicanos Consejo Nacional Contra 
las Adicciones [CONADIC], 2003). Although some people 
satisfy their curiosity about drugs and then quit using 
them, there are people who keep using drugs until they get 
trapped by addiction. Therefore, rehabilitation programs 
are as important as prevention programs. According to Colin 
Mangham (2007), prevention and rehabilitation programs are 
the two pillars of drug-demand reduction. 
Drug addiction is not exclusive to poor people by any 
means. However, there are some studies that suggest that 
poverty can help trigger drug abuse among both young people 
and adults (Reyes Morales et al., 2009). Harsh living 
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conditions and a lack of opportunities lead some people to 
turn to drugs to escape, or to at least forget, their 
desperate social circumstances for a few hours (“Niños de 
la Calle,” 2006). If, meanwhile, public rehabilitation 
programs are absent, the odds of poor people spending money 
for rehabilitation instead of food or drugs is unlikely. 
This, in turn, might lead these people to lose their jobs 
because of their drug addiction, and then a vicious, 
downward cycle starts.   
In a country like Mexico, with almost 50% of the 
population living in conditions of poverty or social 
marginalization (Gutiérrez, 2009), public drug 
rehabilitation programs should be as important as other 
social and public health programs. However, nowadays in 
cities such as Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez, which have very 
high rates of drug-related crime, rehabilitation programs 
reach only 20% of estimated drug-users (Case et al., 2008).  
As previously mentioned, the social harm associated 
with illegal drug use does not stop with drug addiction. 
The risk of contagious diseases and the spread of various 
illnesses are high among drug users, especially among 
injecting drug users (IDU). Therefore, proponents of harm 
reduction recommend that needle exchange programs (NEP) and 
other harm-reduction programs, such as drug injection 
facilities, need to be considered part of an integrated 
anti-drug policy (O'Loughlin, 2007). In Mexico the position 
of the public health institutions is that harm-reduction 
policies are necessary to ameliorate Mexico’s HIV/AIDS 
epidemic (CONADIC, 2003). 
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However, harm-reduction programs have not received 
enough support in Mexico. According to the Mexican 
government, harm-reduction programs reach only 24% of the 
IDU population, and most of the efforts are being made by 
NGOs (Estados Unidos Mexicanos Centro Nacional para la 
Prevención y Control de VIH/SIDA [CENSIDA], 2009). In 
addition, the ways in which these programs are evaluated 
are based on the number of needles provided, and there is 
no data about the impact of these programs on Mexico’s 
HIV/AIDS epidemic and other blood-related illnesses. 
Therefore, it is important that the Mexican government 
devote more attention to harm-reduction programs and 
sponsor more research about how these programs can be 
adapted and improved. In addition, more aggressive methods 
of engaging drug users directly, such as trough methadone 
programs for heroin addicts, might be worth testing in 
Mexico. The impact on the health and well-being of the 
population that reducing drug demand might have should not 
be underestimated. 
D. MEXICAN AUTHORITIES 
None of the measures proposed thus far will work, 
unless there is strong encouragement at and by all three 
levels of government. Today, discussion in Mexico is 
focused on the police departments and the judiciary system. 
Even though it is clear that the Mexican government needs 
to build strong police forces at the local level to keep 
drug cartels under control, for Astorga Almanza (personal 
communication, August 25, 2009) and Guillermo Garduño 
Valero (personal communication, August 26, 2009) the former 
will not be possible until the Mexican political system 
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changes and allows the development of independent police 
and judiciary systems. Therefore, in order to see 
improvements in policing, the political system must first 
improve.  
Nor is the current way in which police and military 
units deploy against the drug cartels helpful for 
reestablishing the link between the population and the 
authorities. As a matter of fact, authorities might be 
sending the wrong message to the population through simple 
actions, such as law enforcement officers wearing 
balaclavas to hide their identity. If the authorities 
demonstrate that they are afraid of retaliation by the drug 
cartels, then what can the common citizen expect? A new 
model based on community policing, in which units have an 
area of responsibility and the community knows who their 
authorities are, would go a long way to build, or rebuild, 
trust between authorities and the public (Felbab-Brown, 
2009). 
It also has to be borne in mind that police officials 
in those small counties where drug cartels have a strong 
presence are caught between two fights. On the one hand, 
there are the drug cartels with their death threats. On the 
other hand, there are the federal authorities looking for 
information and/or assistance. Although threats by drug 
traffickers should not be an excuse for a police officer to 
avoid doing his job, it is a fact that for a county 
policeman, it is difficult not to comply with the drug 
cartels’ demands when his family’s safety is being 
threatened (Tapia, 2009). Therefore, it might be helpful 
for federal authorities to bear this in mind when they 
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deploy to these counties. This means that it is necessary 
to develop mechanisms to offer an option (not a pardon) to 
those police officers who were coerced by the drug cartels 
and now want to stop cooperating with them. This may 
include recruiting police officers as informants and 
protecting their families.  
A number of years ago, Layne et al. (2001) found out 
that fear of informants is of particular concern in 
criminal organizations and for most drug traffickers is the 
most feared way of getting caught by authorities. 
Ironically, in Mexico drug cartels have overcome this fear 
by bribing authorities. However, Mexican authorities can 
use this in their favor. They can establish an information 
campaign in every police department to recruit police 
officers as informants, or even lie at the end of a 
successful operation by attributing the outcome to a police 
informant instead of a police investigation. This might 
reduce the number of police officers who are coerced. 
Even though it is not the purpose of this thesis to 
evaluate the current police structures in Mexico, it is a 
fact that the Mexican authorities need to reevaluate the 
current police model and its relation with the political 
structure in order to build an independent and strong 
police force. Whatever police model the Mexican government 
decides to adopt, strong local police departments are as 
important as the federal police in the current fight 
against the drug cartels. However, Mexican authorities must 
also be aware that the willingness of citizens to follow 
the rule of law in a democratic system is based on 
recognizing that the social contract is working. This is 
 77
only achieved when citizens and government are tied 
together by strong links in a “common framework of social 
order, political representation, and political action” 
(Davis, 2006, p. 80). 
This concept of the social contract is tied closely to 
the performance of the whole government. If people do not 
feel that their most basic needs are being satisfied, there 
is probably no reason for them to follow the rule of law. 
The same applies when people believe that government 
officials are corrupt and that they are being protected by 
political parties. The Mexican government at all levels 
must take a step back from the “war on drugs” and 
reevaluate its performance in order to strengthen the 
social contract. The Mexican government must be aware that 
every vacuum left due to its poor performance, can 
potentially be filled by criminal organizations (Aranda, 
2009; Ramos Pérez, 2009). 
E. CONCLUSION 
The drug cartels have adapted very well to counterdrug 
efforts in Mexico, thanks in part to the lack of innovation 
in the way the Mexican authorities have fought them. Almost 
a century has passed since Mexico decided to prohibit 
marijuana and other drugs, without being able to foresee 
the consequences. Today, the world has a better 
understanding about the effects of drug markets and about 
the social harm related to the use of illegal drugs. 
Therefore, Mexico should act to reduce the size of the 
illegal drug trade by methods other than a direct attack on 
organized crime. It is time for the Mexican authorities to 
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move forward and test new approaches in order to find the 
correct balance between social harm reduction (demand) and 
supply reduction.  
In order to do this, the Mexican government must 
define an anti-drug strategy that is a well-coordinated 
effort, making use of the still limited resources that the 
Mexican state has available. Mexico’s authorities have to 
look at the past and review what authorities did to reduce 
the homicide rate fifteen years ago. According to Medina 
Mora, that shift was “the result of managing well social 
conflicts in regions with high rates of violence” (qtd. in 
Aranda, 2009, ¶ 6). The actors and events today might seem 
different; however, the need to address the roots of the 
problem remains the same. In the Mexican case, the 
grievances and inequalities in Mexican society that push 
people into criminal behavior, as well as towards drug use, 
need to be addressed in order to reduce drug-related crime. 
Certainly there will always be organized crime groups. 
However, in a more egalitarian society where people are 
able to satisfy their basic necessities by legal means, 




Almost a century has passed since Mexico joined an 
uneven, but increasingly international effort to eradicate 
the use of certain drugs for recreational purposes; 
however, the outcome has not been as expected. Despite the 
fact that the world was able to stop the opium epidemic of 
the early twentieth century (UNODC, 2008), arguably by 
using a supply-reduction approach, the world has been 
unable to eradicate the illegal drug trade by applying this 
approach. Eighty years ago the world did not know what the 
consequences of drug prohibition would be; or, more 
precisely, the world did not want to pay attention to the 
lessons learned from alcohol prohibition. Mexico was no 
exception, and thanks to traditionally low levels of 
illegal drug consumption among Mexicans, it was easy for 
authorities to focus on supply-reduction policies to help 
other countries to address “their” drug demand problem. 
This did not help the Mexican government prepare itself for 
the possibility of the demand for illegal drugs growing 
dramatically in Mexico. 
Today, Mexico faces a dilemma: keep following the same 
anti-drug strategy that has proven ineffective since its 
implementation, or make the adjustments necessary to 
overcome the current social harm that flows from rising 
domestic illegal drug use. It is not just a matter of 
putting more resources into, or generating a greater 
willingness towards carrying out counterdrug operations. 
The supply-reduction approach has proven to have structural 
limits that have now been reached. The best example of the 
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limits inherent in the supply-reduction approach is the 
failure of the United States’ anti-drug policy. If the 
contemporary global hegemonic power, and the most powerful 
state in the history of humankind (Brzezinski, 1997), a 
country which has also been the main proponent and 
practitioner of the supply-reduction approach for decades, 
has not been able to stop smuggling, production, or 
transnational criminal networks, or more importantly, stop 
illegal drug consumption on its own soil, something is 
clearly wrong with the current anti-drug strategy. Mexico 
should not only keep this in mind, but re-evaluate its 
current counter-drug campaign in order to develop an anti-
drug strategy that balances supply-reduction and harm-
reduction approaches. 
In order to develop a new anti-drug strategy, Mexico 
first has to clearly define what its goals are, and then 
develop a well-coordinated effort using all the resources 
that the state has available to achieve those goals. Law 
enforcement efforts aimed at attacking the drug cartels, 
support from social and crime prevention programs aimed to 
defuse the recruitment capacity of the drug cartels, will 
continue to fail. The same fate will to continue to befall 
law enforcement if drug demand is not addressed properly 
there are always going to be people willing to challenge 
the authorities and organize new drug cartels if there is a 
growing illegal drug demand to satisfy. 
As mentioned previously, the Mexican government needs 
to look beyond the drug cartels and attack the roots of the 
illegal drug problem. Although this thesis has argued that 
the cartels are an important component of the illegal drug 
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trade, they are more of a symptom than an illness. The real 
illness about which the Mexican government has to do 
something is all those social situations that drag people 
into the clutches of the drug cartels, whether for 
employment or as users of illegal drugs. Poverty, 
inequality, lack of opportunity, lack of development, and 
local drug demand, are among the things that should be 
addressed in order to reduce drug-related crime in Mexico. 
Again, this does not mean that the Mexican government 
should stop fighting the drug cartels; however, addressing 
the social and demand-side aspects just mentioned should be 
considered just as important as law enforcement. 
It is a fact that none of these recommendations can be 
implemented without a strong state presence at the local 
level. Regardless of how strong the federal law enforcement 
authorities are, or can be made to be, they are never going 
to be able to cover the whole country. Thus, strengthening 
local police departments should be considered a top 
priority. The current violence with which the drug cartels 
have targeted elements of police departments has to be used 
by the federal and local authorities to rally local police 
departments to fight back against the cartels. This might 
work if the Mexican authorities grant options to local 
policemen; without options the local policemen will 
continue to decide to succumb to the threatening influence 
of the drug cartels rather than respond to the directives 
of the federal authorities. 
Finally, the Mexican government should keep in mind 
that a strong state presence is not achieved just through 
law enforcement. True, effective law enforcement helps to 
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achieve a strong state presence. However, projecting a 
strong state presence just through law enforcement can lead 
to an artificial feeling of stability. The Mexican 
government should seek to strengthen its presence by 
providing public services, education, new employment 
opportunities, and even taxation. That is, the Mexican 
state has to improve its performance at all levels and in 
all areas of state responsibility: nothing short of a 
revitalization of the social contract is going to change 
the current situation. Failure to improve the effectiveness 
of the state and failure to build or rebuild the social 
contract will lead to power vacuums that will continue to 
be filled by new or revitalized criminal organizations. 
This thesis has argued that the Mexican government has 
to switch its focus from attacking the surface (supply-
side) of the illegal drug trade to addressing its social 
roots. There is still time to build on the momentum 
produced through the courageous law enforcement efforts 
being taken against the drug cartels by making the right 
adjustments to the current anti-drug policy. The 
adjustments to Mexico’s current anti-drug strategy proposed 
in this thesis are all open to debate and refinement. 
However, the main objective has been to show that there are 
many more options available to the Mexican authorities that 
are worth trying in an effort to win the war on drugs. 
Mexico does not have anything to lose by trying new anti-
drug strategies. At the same time, it has a lot to lose by 
maintaining an anti-drug policy that has already proven to 
be ineffective both in reducing supply and, more 
importantly, in preventing an explosion in social harm 
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associated with the illegal drug trade. Winning the war on 
drugs will not be easy, but movement towards an integrated 
approach represents a critical first step.   
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